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Harvey Weinstein dramatically altered the way that people view sexual
harassment in the workplace. Workplace sexual harassment is far from a new
phenomenon—with many perpetrators of such harassment (including Weinstein
himself) having gotten away with this misbehavior for decades. Yet the exposure
of Weinstein’s misdeeds opened the floodgates, leading countless women from a
variety of work environments to share their own experiences with sexual
harassment at work. As the #MeToo movement has continued to occupy the
headlines, workplace harassment has begun to seem as ubiquitous as it is
distressing.
This intensified spotlight on sexual harassment has exposed a persistent
frustration among academics, the media, and members of the public, as society
puzzles over what can be done to eliminate sexual misbehavior at work. Robust
research indicates that conventional mechanisms for addressing sexual
harassment, like carefully worded policies or mandatory training sessions, fail
to root out perpetrators like Weinstein. Instead, research demonstrates that only
significant cultural change in the workplace can reduce instances of sexual
misconduct. This Article explores a new—and potentially radical—way of
instilling such cultural change.
This Article describes a little known but powerful remedies principle known
as the faithless servant doctrine, which allows for the disgorgement of
compensation from employees who breach their fiduciary duties to their
employers. When employees breach their fiduciary duties by creating or
perpetuating a culture of workplace harassment, the faithless servant doctrine
could provide companies with a powerful tool to demonstrate that this sexual
misconduct negates any value that a misbehaving employee otherwise brings to
the workplace. This article questions whether using compensation disgorgement
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to hit wrongdoers where it hurts—in their wallets—finally could foster the
cultural shift that is necessary to decrease sexual harassment at work.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2017, the world watched in shock, awe, dismay, and
vindication as famed producer and movie mogul Harvey Weinstein faced an
onslaught of allegations detailing decades of sexual and other misconduct toward
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dozens of women.1 Combined with the astonishment and concern, however, was
a sense of resignation: Weinstein’s misbehavior had been an open secret in
Hollywood for years, seen yet largely ignored by dozen—if not hundreds—of
individuals both inside and outside of the entertainment industry.2 Women had
warned each other behind the scenes to avoid vulnerable interactions with the
producer;3 media outlets had been persuaded to suppress stories of Weinstein’s
indiscretions.4 Allegations regarding Weinstein’s sexual misconduct even found
their way into the opening monologue of the 2013 Academy Awards.5 Yet
despite the swirls of allegations against him, Weinstein for years operated almost
completely unchecked.6
In many ways, the eventual public airing of the charges against Weinstein
opened the floodgates for countless women to come forward, not only
corroborating stories of Weinstein’s misdeeds, but also alleging similar
misbehavior by scores of other men, some well-known and some not.7 From
radio hosts to college professors to businesspeople, men across various industries
found themselves accused of a broad range of sexual misbehavior in the
workplace.8 Women turned to social media to express their collective outrage,
1.
See Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s
Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories
[https://perma.cc/HMU7-B49Z]; Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual
Harassment
Accusers
for
Decades,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html
[https://perma.cc/E5T7-HSCD].
2. See Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
3. Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (relating one woman’s advice to a peer that she “wear a parka
when summoned for duty [by Weinstein] as a layer of protection against unwelcome advances”).
4. See Farrow, supra note 1.
5. See Libby Hill, Seth MacFarlane Reveals Truth About His 2013 Harvey Weinstein Joke, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-sethmacfarlane-reveals-truth-about-his-1507755303-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/J98J-HPRB]
(describing host Seth MacFarlane’s quip regarding nominees for best supporting actress:
“Congratulations . . . [y]ou five ladies no longer have to pretend to be attracted to Harvey Weinstein”).
MacFarlane’s joke received a “considerable response from the room,” id., including “relatively raucous
laughter.” Maya Oppenheim, Seth MacFarlane Made Joke About Harvey Weinstein and Women at 2013
Oscars,
INDEPENDENT
(Oct.
11,
2017),
https://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/films/news/seth-macfarlane-harvey-weinstein-joke-oscars-2013-women-sexualharassment-allegations-a7994506.html [https://perma.cc/7WY2-WNGX]. MacFarlane has since
explained that he made the joke approximately two years after a female friend and colleague confided in
him regarding an inappropriate sexual advance that she received from Weinstein. See id.
6. See Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
7. Cf. Maria LaMagna, Why Sexual Harassers Keep Offending, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/one-major-reason-why-sexual-harassers-can-continue-2017-10-21
[https://perma.cc/B5PK-N6BR] (hereinafter “LaMagna I”) (“[T]he social media campaign #metoo
suggests hundreds of thousands, or even millions of women have experienced harassment in the
workplace.”).
8. See id.; Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced Sexual
Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/21/587671849/anew-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-have-experienced-sexual-harassment
[https://perma.cc/R5BJ-2Y55].
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with millions of people engaging with the #MeToo movement, further exposing
the breadth of this problem across society.9
Amidst the outrage and disbelief, however, another reaction has emerged—
a sort of desperate handwringing, as academics and members of the media and
the public brood about what can be done to prevent this type of misconduct from
continuing to occur.10 Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), a purported expert on fostering fair and unbiased workplace relations,
has expressed befuddlement regarding this issue. In June 2016, months prior to
Harvey Weinstein and #MeToo occupying the headlines, the EEOC’s Select
Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace issued a lengthy
report.11 In the report, the authors wondered, “[w]ith legal liability long ago
established, with reputational harm from harassment well known, with an entire
cottage industry of workplace compliance and training adopted and encouraged
for 30 years, why does so much harassment . . . take place in so many of our
workplaces . . . [and] what can be done to prevent it?”12
This article presents one possible answer to that question. Using
longstanding principles of remedies law, this paper considers whether applying
a little known but powerful doctrine known as the faithless servant doctrine to
perpetrators of workplace sexual harassment could provide substantial
deterrence.
The faithless servant doctrine permits the disgorgement or forfeiture of
compensation from individuals who have breached their duty of loyalty.13 The
doctrine is restitutionary in nature, meaning that it focuses on a wrongdoer’s

9. Cassandra Santiago & Doug Criss, An Activist, a Little Girl and the Heartbreaking Origin of
‘MeToo’, CNN (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/17/us/me-too-tarana-burke-origintrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/8QH8-UW92] (citing Facebook’s assertion that in less than 24 hours
following the announcement of the hashtag, 4.7 million people around the world engaged in the “Me too”
conversation, with more than 12 million posts, comments and reactions).
10. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Training is Largely Ineffective, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 13,
2017),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evidence-based-living/201712/sexual-harassmenttraining-is-largely-ineffective [https://perma.cc/G3TQ-D4EV]; see also Claire Cain Miller, Sexual
Harassment Training Doesn’t Work. But Some Things Do, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 11. 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/upshot/sexual-harassment-workplace-prevention-effective.html
[https://perma.cc/J5YE-X9A5]; Roger Showley, Sexual Harassment Training Expanded – But
Effectiveness
Questioned,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION
TRIBUNE
(Feb.
12,
2018),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/growth-development/sd-fi-sextraining-20180212story.html [https://perma.cc/3FLQ-6VU6].
11. CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm
[https://perma.cc/KE33-QBFJ] (hereinafter “EEOC Task Force Report”).
12. Id. at ii. Notably, the EEOC Task Force Report covered a broader range of harassment than is
the focus of this paper, including not only sexual harassment, but also harassment on the basis of race,
disability, age, ethnicity, color, and religion. See id at iv.
13. Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Application of “Faithless Servant Doctrine,” 24 A.L.R.
6th 399 (originally published in 2007) (describing faithless servant doctrine as providing that “an agent is
entitled to no compensation for conduct which . . . is a breach of his or her duty of loyalty”).
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unjust gain rather than on a victim’s loss.14 While the contours of the faithless
servant doctrine can vary significantly from one jurisdiction to the next,15 and
while even the doctrine’s name may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,16 the
underlying notion of using compensation forfeiture to respond to employees’
wrongful conduct remains a theme for courts that apply these restitutionary
principles.17
Using Harvey Weinstein and his misdeeds as a case study, this article
explores the extent to which conventional models for preventing workplace
sexual harassment have remained largely ineffective. The article further
examines whether a dramatic shift in how businesses and courts approach this
problem—a shift like that which would be embodied by the faithless servant
doctrine and other compensation forfeiture tools—could create the significant
cultural change necessary to decrease this misbehavior. This article largely
represents a thought experiment—a wondering about how society, seemingly
mired in rehashing the same, marginally effective “solutions” to the problem of
sexual harassment at work, might perhaps begin to think about harassment
prevention in another way. While by no means a perfect fit for Weinstein’s
situation, and while perhaps a stretch of restitutionary doctrine more generally,
this paper is intended to provide a fundamentally different way of thinking about
this longstanding problem within the workplace.
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the Weinstein scandal as
an example of the sexual misconduct that has plagued many modern workplaces.
Part II explains why existing means of addressing sexual harassment have proven
ineffective, and argues that changes in the broader workplace culture are required
to reduce instances of this misconduct at work. Part III, finally, explains why the
faithless servant doctrine and similar compensation forfeiture mechanisms could
in some contexts create the type of cultural shift necessary to decrease sexual
harassment at work.18 Part III further explores the complications in applying
14. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1(1) (2d ed., West Pub. Co. 1993) (describing
restitution as “a return or restoration of what the defendant gained in a transaction”).
15. See infra § III.B.2 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
17. While the technical definitions of “compensation forfeiture” and “compensation disgorgement”
may differ somewhat, see, e.g., Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 11th ed.
2019) (defining “forfeiture” as, inter alia, “[t]he divestiture of property without compensation” or as “[t]he
loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty. . .”); cf.
id. (defining “disgorgement” as “[t]he act of giving something up (such as profits illegally obtained) on
demand or by legal compulsion”), this paper uses these terms interchangeably, generally referring to
situations where a court mandates that a high level employee return the compensation that he/she received
during a period in which that individual also engaged in misconduct related to their job.
18. This paper refers to “sexual misconduct,” “sexual misbehavior,” and “sexual harassment,” often
using these terms (and other similar terms) somewhat interchangeably. While much of the conduct
described in this paper would rise to the level of legally actionable sexual harassment, see Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (defining quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment), and/or criminally actionable sexual assault, see, e.g., CA Penal Code § 243.4, even sexual
misconduct that does not trigger civil or criminal liability can create an undesirable working environment
for those targeted by such behavior. While this paper lumps much of this behavior together, it by no means
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these forfeiture ideas to situations like that involving Harvey Weinstein, where
the harasser’s employer (here, the Weinstein Company) may have recklessly
ignored or even been complicit in the underlying wrongful conduct.
I. HARVEY WEINSTEIN AS A CASE STUDY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT GONE
UNCHECKED
For many years, Harvey Weinstein’s name seemed synonymous with movie
gold. As the co-founder of the production and distribution companies Miramax
and the Weinstein Company,19 Weinstein helped to create such movie
masterpieces and cult classics as “Pulp Fiction,” “The English Patient,” “The
Crying Game,” and countless others.20 The Weinstein Company’s films have
grossed an estimated $1.3 billion worldwide,21 garnering 303 Oscar nominations
and 75 Academy Awards.22 Prior to the scandal breaking, in 2016, Weinstein
told the Hollywood Reporter that his studio was worth between $700 million and
$800 million, “in a worst case scenario.”23 Also prior to his public downfall,
Weinstein’s personal wealth was estimated to fall somewhere between $240
million and $300 million.24 Weinstein achieved such financial success all while
being well known within Hollywood for his explosive temper and mercurial
nature,25 and was able to amass tremendous power within the industry—whether
in spite of or because of his volatile temperament.26 Indeed, Weinstein’s sway
within the entertainment industry before his fall was virtually undisputed. As one
reporter observed, “at the annual awards ceremonies, [Weinstein] has been
thanked more than almost anyone else in movie history, ranking just after Steven
Spielberg and right before God.”27

suggests a “one size fits all” solution for this broad range of objectionable conduct. Rather, this paper
posits that the Faithless Servant Doctrine and similar disgorgement strategies could be applied to a broad
range of sexual misbehavior to deter this type of workplace conduct, while still recognizing that different
degrees of misconduct might warrant slightly different responses. Cf. EEOC Task Force Report, supra
note 11, at iv (noting that the Report’s authors “did not confine ourselves to the legal definition of
workplace harassment, but rather included examination of conduct and behaviors which might not be
‘legally actionable,’ but left unchecked, may set the stage for unlawful harassment”); see also id. at 3.
19. See Farrow, supra note 1.
20. See id.
21. See Natalie Robehmed, Why the Weinsteins Aren’t Among Hollywood’s Richest Power Brokers,
FORBES (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2015/08/19/why-the-weinsteinsarent-among-hollywoods-richest-power-brokers/#6d8c1101a3f7 [https://perma.cc/YS8L-ALWL].
22. See id.; Farrow, supra note 1.
23. Gregg Kilday, Harvey Weinstein Explains Recent Movie Release Shifts, TV Growth and Oscar
Prospects
(Q&A),
HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER
(July
21,
2016),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/harvey-weinstein-explains-movie-release-913142
[https://perma.cc/8AUN-MGAD].
24. Brad Tuttle, Harvey Weinstein is One of the Richest Men in Hollywood. Here’s What We Know
About his Money, MONEY (Oct. 12, 2017), http://money.com/money/4978630/harvey-weinstein-networth-money/ [https://perma.cc/EB6C-ZX7K].
25. See Farrow, supra note 1.
26. See id.
27. Id.
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It is within the context of such tremendous power that Weinstein faced an
onslaught of harassment allegations in fall of 2017.28 Perhaps equally shocking
are the scope, scale, and extreme nature of the allegations against Harvey
Weinstein. As has now become common knowledge, Weinstein has been
accused of sexual misconduct by more than 100 women,29 with allegations that
span back for more than three decades, during Weinstein’s time heading the
Weinstein Company as well as during his previous tenure at the helm of
Miramax.30 His alleged victims include some of the most prominent names in the
entertainment industry, from Gwyneth Paltrow to Rosanna Arquette to Angelina
Jolie, as well as scores of other lesser-known actresses.31 Weinstein often would
begin by attempting to lure women into private rooms, requesting a massage or
asking them to watch him bathe, but the allegations against him also include
multiple counts of forced sexual contact, claims that Weinstein exposed himself
or masturbated in front of unwilling women, as well as at least four allegations
of sexual assault or rape.32 According to some accounts, female Weinstein
employees were “used as ‘honeypots’ to lure victims into meetings under the
pretense of normal business,”33 only for Weinstein to later dismiss them, leaving
him alone with his intended targets.34 Moreover, as a buffer against the exposure
of his misdeeds, Weinstein mandated that all employees adhere to a strict code
of silence, under which employees were prohibited from criticizing the
Weinstein Company or its leaders in any way that could harm the company’s or
its leaders’ reputations.35

28.

See id.
See Amelia Schonbeck, The Complete List of Allegations Against Harvey Weinstein, THE CUT
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.thecut.com/2020/01/harvey-weinstein-complete-list-allegations.html
[https://perma.cc/B9XY-8LT9]; Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A
Complete
List
of
the
87
Accusers,
USA TODAY
(Oct.
27,
2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-listaccusers/804663001/ [https://perma.cc/G7MT-6LFU].
30. See Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, Harvey Weinstein Made an Absolute Fortune Off Movies
Featuring
his
Alleged
Victims,
MOTHER
JONES
(Oct.
11,
2017),
https://www.motherjones.com/media/2017/10/harvey-weinstein-made-an-absolute-fortune-off-moviesfeaturing-his-alleged-victims/ [https://perma.cc/A4WG-BF8H].
31. See id.
32. See id.; Farrow, supra note 1; Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, It May Not Matter What the
Weinstein
Company
Knew,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
14,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/harvey-weinstein-company-legalconsequences/542838/ [https://perma.cc/4SGC-G2E8] (hereinafter “Hemel & Lund I”).
33. Ryan Faughnder, Victoria Kim & Stephen Battaglio, As Harvey Weinstein Sex Scandal Grows,
One Accuser Says His Company was Negligent, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-fi-ct-harvey-weinstein-huett-20171025-story.html
[https://perma.cc/C36R-L927].
34. Id.
35. Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
29.
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In addition to the individual consequences Weinstein faces—including both
criminal charges36 and civil lawsuits,37—the Weinstein Company and its Board
of Directors may also be liable for their alleged complicity in Weinstein’s
schemes. Indeed, as discussed in greater detail below, the Weinstein Company’s
Board of Directors at best seemed to turn a blind eye to Weinstein’s misconduct,
adopting an almost willful refusal to acknowledge behavior that was common
knowledge across the majority of the entertainment industry.38 At worst, the
Weinstein Company was actively cooperating with the harassment: The
Weinstein Company repeatedly declined to investigate Weinstein in the face of
harassment allegations, while quietly settling claims with women who accused
Weinstein of misconduct, and while continuing to renew Weinstein’s lucrative
employment contract.39 This failure to investigate and subsequent cover-up
demonstrates an apparent willingness to give Weinstein broad discretion to abuse
scores of women over three decades so long as the Oscars and profits continued
to pile up. Such apparent complicity led at least one alleged target of Weinstein’s
misconduct, actress Dominique Huett, to file a negligence suit against the
Weinstein Company, claiming that the company knew about Weinstein’s alleged
misconduct and failed to protect the women with whom Weinstein came into
contact.40 Weinstein, Miramax, and the Weinstein Company also previously
36. See Jessica M. Goldstein, From Racketeering Claims to Rape Charges, a Guide to All the Cases
Against Harvey Weinstein, THINKPROGESS.ORG (Oct. 25, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/the-manymany-cases-against-harvey-weinstein-a-complete-guide-d14a1d99a0cd/ [https://perma.cc/229U-LXS4];
Eric Levenson & Elizabeth Joseph, Harvey Weinstein Judge Declines to Dismiss Charges in Rape Case,
Sets Pretrial Hearing for March, CNN (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/20/us/harveyweinstein-court-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/R8X3-KT7D] (reporting Weinstein faced at least
five felony charges, including predatory sexual assault and rape, in connection with two women in two
unrelated incidents); Jan Ransom and Jose A. Del Real, Harvey Weinstein Charged with Rape in Los
Angeles
as
N.Y.
Trial
Starts,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-trial.html
[https://perma.cc/2L4AH7MQ] (reporting that prosecutors in Los Angeles filed additional rape charges against Weinstein based
on allegations involving two other women). In February of 2020, a New York jury found Weinstein guilty
of first-degree criminal sexual act and third degree rape. Jan Ransom, Harvey Weinstein’s Stunning
Downfall: 23 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Published Mar.11, 2020, Updated Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-sentencing.html
[https://perma.cc/2C7Q-H8NS]. Weinstein was sentenced to 23 years in prison. Id.
37. Weinstein also faces multiple civil suits, either individually or as part of other litigation against
his former company, see Goldstein, supra note 36; Dominic Patten, Harvey Weinstein Fails to Get Class
Action Tossed; Bob Weinstein, Disney, TWC Board & David Glasser Dropped From Case, DEADLINE
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://deadline.com/2019/04/harvey-weinstein-sexual-assault-lawsuit-class-actiondismissal-failure-bob-weinstein-twc-1202598535/ [https://perma.cc/33GW-8GGN] (reporting civil suits
against Weinstein in both the United States and the United Kingdom); Associated Press, Judge Allows
Sex-Trafficking Claim in Suit Against Harvey Weinstein, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/judge-allows-sex-trafficking-claim-suit-harvey-weinstein1203150 [https://perma.cc/99XV-QSPU]; Tom Connick, Harvey Weinstein Facing UK Civil Claim Over
Sexual
Assault
Allegations,
NEW
MUSICAL
EXPRESS
(Nov.
27,
2017),
https://www.nme.com/news/film/harvey-weinstein-facing-uk-civil-claim-sexual-assault-allegations2165809 [https://perma.cc/AR35-82BB].
38. See infra § III.D and accompanying text.
39. See id.
40. See Faughnder et al., supra note 33.
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faced class action charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act, among other claims,41 but those claims were
dismissed as to the Weinstein Company (although not as to Harvey Weinstein
himself) in April 2019.42
Beyond any legal consequences, the financial toll on Weinstein and his
former company is estimated at $390 to $490 million. While it is difficult to
determine with certainty the company’s value prior to the scandal, previouslynoted estimates range from $700 million to $800 million. In the wake of the
scandal, the Weinstein Company tried and failed to broker a deal with an investor
group to purchase the company for $500 million.43 That deal collapsed after New
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil rights lawsuit against the
company.44 Ultimately, the Weinstein Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in March 2018,45 and a private equity firm acquired the company’s
assets for $289 million in July 2018.46
The impact of the scandal on Weinstein’s personal fortune is more difficult
to determine, but likely is less consequential. On the one hand, at the time the
scandal broke, Weinstein held a more than 20% stake in the (soon-to-be defunct)
Weinstein Company.47 As a major equity holder in the company, Weinstein’s
equity was “expected to be wiped out” by the company’s bankruptcy
proceedings.48 Moreover, Weinstein’s wife, Georgina Chapman, announced that
she was leaving Weinstein in the wake of the scandal,49 and this divorce may
prove financially costly to him as well. Yet despite these financial hits,
Weinstein’s personal financial future seems far from bleak: Weinstein likely
41. See The Weinstein Company and Others Face RICO Claim in Wake of Sexual Assault ‘Cover
Ups,’ FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2017/12/06/theweinstein-company-and-others-face-rico-claim-in-wake-of-sexual-assault-cover-ups/#7ed55f1d48fe
[https://perma.cc/KQS3-LXP6]
42. See Patten, supra note 37; Associated Press, supra note 37.
43. See Anna Menta, What is The Weinstein Company Worth? Studio Declares Bankruptcy After
$500
Million
Deal
Collapses,
NEWSWEEK
(Feb.
26,
2018,
1:51
PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/weinstein-company-net-worth-declares-bankruptcy-820270
[https://perma.cc/4L3M-5ZY8]; Chris Isidore, Remains of the Weinstein Company Sold—to the Only Real
Bidder, CNN BUSINESS (May 2, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/02/media/weinsteincompany-bidder/index.html [https://perma.cc/9Y8Q-U8DB].
44. See Elahe Izadi, The Weinstein Co. Declares Bankruptcy. Here’s What That Means and What
Could Be Next, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/artsand-entertainment/wp/2018/03/20/the-weinstein-company-declares-bankruptcy-heres-what-that-meansand-what-could-be-next/?utm_term=.3b7e456916b5 [https://perma.cc/8AZF-6TVZ]; Menta, supra note
43.
45. Izadi, supra note 44; see Menta, supra note 43.
46. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Lantern Entertainment Closes $289 Million Acquisition of the
Weinstein Co’s Assets, DEADLINE (July 18, 2018), https://deadline.com/2018/07/lantern-entertainmentcloses-289-million-acquisition-weinstein-co-s-assets-1202427141/ [https://perma.cc/W7U8-QQD6]
47. See Josh Dickey, Want to be Sure You’re Not Paying Harvey Weinstein? There’s Only One
Way, MASHABLE (Oct. 19, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/10/19/harvey-weinstein-make-moneymovies-films-dimension-co [https://perma.cc/9Y8Q-U8DB].
48. See Izadi, supra note 44
49. See Tuttle, supra note 24; Oppenheim, supra note 5.
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participated in hundreds of backend revenue deals related to his films,50 many of
which are classic movies that not only earned money at the time of their release,
but which have continued (and presumably will continue) to line Weinstein’s
pockets every time they are enjoyed.51 Moreover, reports indicate that Weinstein
reached a tentative settlement of the civil claims against him for $47 million, all
of which apparently would be paid by the Weinstein Company’s insurance
providers.52 While some accusers have elected not to join this settlement, and
while criminal prosecutions against Weinstein remain ongoing despite this
settlement, this resolution renders it quite possible that Weinstein can walk away
from his wrongdoing with minimal direct personal financial impact.53
II. MINIMIZING HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AND BEYOND
While much about the Weinstein scandal might seem shocking and unique,
Weinstein’s conduct resembles the type of behavior that takes place in a variety
of workplaces. The EEOC received 7,609 charges of sexual harassment in fiscal
year 2018 alone,54 representing almost 10% of the 76,418 total charges filed with
the agency that year.55 According to the EEOC, anywhere between 25% and 85%
of women report experiencing sexual harassment at work, and this statistic does
not include the many instances of sexual harassment which go unreported and
even unidentified by the women targeted.56 The fact that in this case, such
50.

See Dickey, supra note 47.
See Kelsea Stahler, Should We Watch the Hundreds of Films Produced by Harvey Weinstein?
Female Film Critics Weigh In, BUSTLE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/should-we-watch-thehundreds-of-films-produced-by-harvey-weinstein-female-film-critics-weigh-in-2894326
[https://perma.cc/4RVP-DH6V] (observing that “ignoring Weinstein’s impact on the landscape of film is
impossible” and noting that he “executive produced over 100 films, so many of which are considered
classics”); Dickey, supra note 47 (asserting that the only certain way to avoid putting money in
Weinstein’s pocket is to stop watching his movies).
52. See Megan Twohey and Jodi Kantor, Weinstein and His Accusers Reach Tentative $25 Million
Deal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Published
Dec.
11,
2019,
Updated
Jan.
22,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/us/harvey-weinstein-settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/K5TASRPK] (noting that $25 million of the tentative settlement is set to go directly to Weinstein’s accusers).
Further, $12 million in legal fees for the company’s officers and directors (including Weinstein) is
included in this tentative settlement. See id.
53. See Lucy Osborne, Harvey Weinstein: fourth accuser opts out of settlement to pursue own
claim, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2020) https://www.theguardian.com/film/2020/jan/19/harvey-weinsteinaccuser-settlement [https://perma.cc/7GBF-5E6N]; Ransom and Del Real, supra note 36; see
also Ransom, supra note 36 (noting Weinstein’s convictions and sentencing with respect to criminal
charges in New York).
54. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGES ALLEGING SEX-BASED HARASSMENT
(CHARGES
FILED
WITH
EEOC)
FY
2010
FY
2019,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm [https://perma.cc/T7XGU247].
55. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS (CHARGES FILED WITH
EEOC) FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2019, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
[https://perma.cc/CY73-TTC4].
56. See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 8; Nilofer Merchant, The Insidious Economic
Impact of Sexual Harassment, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/11/the-insidiouseconomic-impact-of-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/6D83-2L2N]; cf. Chatterjee, supra note 8
51.
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misbehavior originated from a famous movie executive—as opposed to an
employee in a less glamorous workplace—renders the harassment perhaps
different in degree but certainly not in kind. As one of Weinstein’s own victims
observed, Weinstein’s behavior constituted “[t]extbook sexual harassment,”57
encompassing the same sort of unchecked power dynamics that could exist in a
variety of settings.58 Therefore, there may be lessons to draw from Weinstein’s
downfall that could inform approaches to minimizing workplace sexual
harassment more generally.
In the weeks and months following the Weinstein scandal breaking—
particularly as additional accounts of workplace harassment began to emerge
across various other industries— governmental officials, industry insiders, and
members of the public wondered how such appalling and disgraceful behavior
could have gone on unabated for so long in so many industries.59 More
affirmatively, many of these same individuals began the search for solutions to
this problem—began trying to examine ways in which inappropriate sexual
misconduct at work might be minimized or eliminated altogether. The vast
majority of businesses already seemed to have undertaken steps that, at first
glance, one reasonably might conclude would prevent this behavior. For
example, in a survey of human resources professionals conducted in the fall of
2017, approximately 90% of the respondents said that their companies had a
policy against sexual harassment.60 In the same survey, approximately 71% of
respondents said that their companies conduct some form of sexual harassment
training.61
Despite these commitments to policies and training, however, sexual
harassment claims continue to deluge the EEOC, comprising a substantial
portion of the complaints that the agency receives every year.62 Such statistics
naturally beg the question of the effectiveness of current practices. If companies
have been adhering to these policies and practicing this training, how could
#MeToo and similar movements have exposed such far-reaching incidents of
harassment in such a wide variety of workplaces? Apparently, policies against
workplace harassment are not enough; training alone will not abate this problem.
(citing survey finding that 81% of women have experienced sexual harassment at work); Stahler, supra
note 51 (positing that at least one third of all women experience sexual harassment at work).
57. Farrow, supra note 1.
58. See id. (quoting Weinstein victim’s analogy that “[i]t’s a pretty clear case of sexual harassment
when your superior, the C.E.O., asks one of their inferiors, a temp, to have sex with them, essentially in
exchange for mentorship”).
59. See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1; Faughnder et al., supra note
33; Jessica Valenti, It’s No Accident That Sexual Harassers Rise Up the Ranks, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2017,
6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/04/sexual-harassers-rise-ranks-redflag [https://perma.cc/8XQF-7PAT].
60. See Maya Rhodan, Does Sexual Harassment Training Work? Here’s What the Research Shows,
TIME (Nov. 21, 2017), http://time.com/5032074/does-sexual-harassment-training-work-heres-what-theresearch-shows/ [https://perma.cc/P62A-KZNB]; EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11.
61. See Rhodan, supra note 60.
62. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.

296

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

Vol. 41:2

Rather, research indicates that other steps must be taken to deter workers from
engaging in—and companies from tolerating—this type of inappropriate
workplace behavior.63

A. The Inadequacy of Traditional Mechanisms for Countering
Harassment at Work
Despite the increased attention that has been paid to sexual harassment in
the workplace, much of the effort that companies have made in attempting to
counter this conduct is ineffective and aimed at limiting their own liability. For
example, while sexual harassment training has become standard practice in the
majority of workplaces,64 a wealth of research suggests the inadequacy and
ineffectiveness of this training.65 For one thing, many employees fail to take such
training seriously and are simply “clicking through a PowerPoint, checking a box
that you read the employee handbook or attending a mandatory seminar at which
someone lectures about harassment while attendees glance at their phones.”66
Compounding this problem, the financial and logistical costs associated with inperson training programs mean that many companies now rely upon online
tutorials, thereby making it even more difficult to ensure that employees
undertake such training thoughtfully and seriously.67 Even more concerning, for
many companies that implement these programs, reducing workplace
harassment may not be the only (or even the primary) goal: The focus, instead,
is on corporate self-protection—on “reduc[ing] the likelihood of being named in
harassment suits or . . . check[ing] a box for E.E.O.C. purposes.”68

63.

See infra § II.B.
See Jena McGregor, Why Sexual Harassment Training Doesn’t Stop Harassment, WASH. POST
(Nov. 17, 2017, 11:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/11/17/whysexual-harassment-training-doesnt-stop-harassment/?utm_term=.5c80671c60a1 [https://perma.cc/KR3286KN].
65. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Training Programs and Reporting Systems Won’t
End Sexual Harassment. Promoting Women Will, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/11/training-programs-and-reporting-systems-wont-end-sexual-harassmentpromoting-more-women-will [https://perma.cc/6KYK-2F53] (describing mixed results with respect to the
effectiveness of sexual harassment training); see generally Rhodan, supra note 60; Mariel Tishma, How
Effective is Mandatory Harassment Training?, CHIEF LEARNING OFFICER (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.chieflearningofficer.com/2018/04/27/effective-mandatory-harassment-training/
[https://perma.cc/T549-4W4H].
66. See Miller, supra note 10; cf. McGregor, supra note 64 (describing the “disdain” expressed
toward sexual harassment training programs, even by the very individuals who promote such programs).
67. See McGregor, supra note 64.
68. See Miller, supra note 10 (quoting a psychologist at Rice University). Sexual harassment
training can bolster an employer’s defense against certain types of sexual harassment claims. Under
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998), an employer may have an affirmative defense against claims of harassment that do not involve an
adverse employment action if the employer can demonstrate: (1) it took reasonable steps to prevent and
promptly correct sexual harassment in the workplace; and (2) the aggrieved employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of the employer’s preventive or corrective measures. See Miller, supra note 10;
PSYCHOL. TODAY, supra note 10.
64.
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Even when taken seriously by employers and employees, workplace sexual
harassment training exhibits severe limitations in its usefulness. Studies indicate
that such training does not appear to be effective either at reducing the number
of incidents of harassment in the workplace or at shifting the workplace culture
toward one that views harassment as a serious problem.69 More specifically,
while this training generally is credited with increasing employees’ knowledge
about sexual harassment—for example, teaching workers about the definition of
harassment and how to report alleged violations in the workplace70—this
increased knowledge does not translate into behavioral changes among those
inclined to engage in harassment.71 In fact, according to at least some research,
harassment training actually can reinforce some gender stereotypes, at least in
the short term, and can make participants uncomfortable, prompting defensive
jokes.72 Such findings have led one set of researchers to assert that men who
already appeared prone toward engaging in sexual harassment “come out of
training with significantly worse attitudes toward harassment, thinking it is no
big deal.”73

B. The Magic Bullet: Changing the Workplace Culture
If policies and training do not seem to be adequately decreasing the
incidence of sexual harassment at work, what other steps might employers take
to accomplish this goal? Tellingly, research has revealed that changing the
culture within a workplace can reduce the amount of harassment at work.74
Research in this area suggests that “[t]o actually prevent harassment, companies
need to create a culture in which women are treated as equals and employees
treat one another with respect.”75 The EEOC has echoed this finding, asserting
that “[w]orkplace culture has the greatest impact on allowing harassment to
flourish, or conversely, in preventing harassment.”76
A workplace’s culture encompasses the “patterns of accepted behavior” at
work, and “the beliefs and values that promote and reinforce [these patterns of

69.

See McGregor, supra note 64; EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 47.
See PSYCHOL. TODAY supra note 10; Miller, supra note 10; EEOC Task Force Report, supra
note 11, at 48.
71. See Miller, supra note 10; cf. EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 47 (concluding it is
“less probable that training programs, on their own, will have a significant impact on changing employees’
attitudes, and they may sometimes have the opposite effect”).
72. Miller, supra note 10.
73. Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 65.
74. See, e.g. Miller, supra note 10; Rhodan, supra note 60; Erika Andersen, 3 Things You Can Do
to
Change
People’s
Behavior,
FORBES
(Aug.
17,
2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikaandersen/2012/08/17/3-things-you-can-do-to-change-peoplesbehavior/#3738d6f57a0a [https://perma.cc/KY9P-5MWU]; see also Merchant, supra note 56 (arguing
that “[i]nstead of thinking of sexually predatory behavior as a few (or many) bad seeds, we ask, instead . . .
how do we change our organizations to rebalance power”).
75. Miller, supra note 10.
76. See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at v; see also id. at 31.
70.
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behavior].”77 One can think of the “patterns of behavior” within an organization
as those things that are deemed acceptable in that workplace—things that are
“OK to do.”78 Changing these mechanisms—both patterns of behavior and the
individual beliefs that underlie such behavior—is no easy task. To the contrary,
seeking such change means undoing opinions, principles, activities and programs
that may have come to infuse the very fabric of the workplace. In the sexual
harassment context, this means that organizations must not simply go through
the motions, but rather must “create a culture in which women are treated as
equals and employees treat one another with respect.”79 It means moving from a
workplace culture where behavior like Weinstein’s has been tolerated and
enabled to one where such behavior is not simply no longer the norm, but rather
will shock the conscience of those observing such conduct.
While shifting a workplace’s culture may be difficult, a wealth of research
supports the effectiveness of such efforts in combating harassment. For example,
one study found that organizational climate—defined as the “organizational
characteristics that communicate tolerance of sexual harassment”—plays a
significant role in facilitating sexual harassment in the workplace.80 Specifically,
researchers found that female employees who believe that their organization
tolerates sexual harassment (demonstrated by complaints not being taken
seriously, by the presence of risks associated with complaining, and by the
unlikelihood of perpetrators being punished) end up experiencing higher levels
of harassment at work.81 This undoubtedly would dovetail with the experiences
of employees at the Weinstein Company: Surely, an employee of the Weinstein
Company, observing the company’s Board of Directors renew Weinstein’s
contract in the face of multiple allegations of harassment82—allegations that had
become common knowledge among employees and others83—would not believe
that he/she was working within a workplace culture that truly took seriously such
inappropriate conduct. Potential victims therefore might stay silent out of fear of
not being taken seriously, and other potential perpetrators might feel empowered
to mirror Weinstein’s conduct. In other words, such employees might not simply
feel disgruntled about the way in which the Weinstein Company handled
concerns about harassment; according to this research, such employees would be
more likely themselves ultimately to experience sexual harassment at work.
So how could companies like the Weinstein Company truly “change the
culture” within the workplace to emphasize that harassment will not be tolerated?
While no single formula will work within every organization, research supports
77.

Andersen, supra note 74.
See id.
79. Miller, supra note 10.
80. Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in
Organizations: A Test of an Integrated Model, 82 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL., No. 4, 578, 579 (1997)
(citations omitted).
81. Id. at 586.
82. See Faughnder et al., supra note 33; Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32.
83. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
78.
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several key themes that seem effective in triggering workplace cultural change:
Organizations must foster a workplace culture that exhibits a serious and sober
approach to sexual harassment; they must respond to incidents of harassment
with swift and severe ramifications; and they must foster an overall power
structure that inhibits those in power from taking advantage of others who fall
lower in the hierarchy.84
1. Changing the Workplace Culture by Modeling a Serious, Sober
Approach to Workplace Sexual Harassment
One way in which employers might alter their workplace culture to decrease
the incidence of sexual harassment more forcefully is to model the seriousness
with which they condemn such misbehavior. As one author who studies cultural
change has pointed out, “normalization” forms an important part of creating
cultural change.85 Before individuals will change the way that they behave,
“[they] need to feel that ‘people like me act this way, and people I admire and
want to emulate act this way.’”86 Generating change requires “giv[ing]
[employees] some evidence that their peers (at least the ones they like) and their
role models are behaving in those ways.”87 Thus, employers must convey to their
workforce that inappropriate sexual misconduct at work will not be
countenanced or accepted—that such misconduct falls outside the bounds of
permissible workplace behavior.
Part of normalizing a culture that refuses to countenance harassment (or,
perhaps, de-normalizing a culture in which harassment is accepted) involves
destroying any notion that a workplace harasser can “get away with” such
behavior and eliminating any impunity that the harasser otherwise might feel.
One renowned researcher in this area concurs that “[i]mpunity plays a large
role.”88 According to this researcher, men who already possess certain
characteristics will engage in sexually harassing behavior when they are put in
situations where the system suggests that they can do so while avoiding
punishment.89 The EEOC Task Force more straightforwardly observed that
“[o]rganizational cultures that tolerate harassment have more of it, and
workplaces that are not tolerant of harassment have less of it.”90 Organizations

84.

See infra §§ II.B.1-3.
See Andersen, supra note 74.
86. Id. (italics omitted).
87. Id.
88. William Wan, What Makes Some Men Sexual Harassers? Science Tries to Explain the Creeps
of the World, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-ofscience/wp/2017/12/20/what-makes-some-men-sexual-harassers-science-tries-to-explain-the-harveyweinsteins-of-the-world/?utm_term=.1440477d5746 [https://perma.cc/H2M5-XQQX] (quoting John
Pryor, a psychologist at Illinois State University).
89. See id. (quoting Pryor, a psychologist).
90. EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 32; see also id. at 31 (noting that one key factor
for reducing harassment at work is “leadership and commitment to a diverse, inclusive, and respectful
workforce in which harassment is simply not acceptable . . .”).
85.
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therefore must model, from the top down, the seriousness with which they
approach concerns about harassment, from having top executives repeatedly
vocalize their condemnation of such behavior,91 to having leaders attend and/or
endorse any harassment training.92
Applying these ideas to the Weinstein scandal makes clear the extent to
which the Weinstein Company modeled the exact opposite environment that
would be required to minimize harassment in the workplace. The notion of
Weinstein or any of his key executives modeling a zero tolerance attitude
towards sexual harassment should be laughable to anyone who knows about
Weinstein’s misdeeds and the extensive cover-up that his staff engineered.93
Countless witnesses have come forward in the wake of the scandal attesting to
the perceived invincibility of Weinstein within the organization—the extent to
which Weinstein operated seemingly unaccountable to anyone within the
company.94 As one victim observed about Weinstein’s behavior, “I know that
everybody—I mean everybody—in Hollywood knows that it’s happening . . . .
He’s not even really hiding . . . . [T]he way he does it, so many people are
involved and see what’s happening. But everyone’s too scared to say anything.”95
Even those who attempted to turn to the Weinstein Company’s human resources
department to address their concerns found themselves faced with an entity that
refused to act: According to one insider, such victims purportedly were told,
“This is his company. If you don’t like it, you can leave.”96
Organizations can model a serious and sober approach to sexual harassment
not only by putting in place effective policies and procedures that oppose
harassment97 (something that most organizations have been doing with minimal
effect for decades),98 but also by backing up those policies and procedures with
resources in the form of money and time.99 Specifically, research indicates that
the most effective sexual harassment training lasts at least 4 hours and takes place
in person, tailored to the particular workplace.100 Such robust training won’t
come cheap. Yet by demonstrating the seriousness with which the employer

91. See Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 65 (advising that “CEOs must take a strong public stand
against workplace harassment—and keep repeating that message”).
92. See Rhodan, supra note 60.
93. Cf. Farrow, supra note 1 (explaining that many current and former executives and assistants at
the Weinstein Company knew of the allegations and helped cover up for Weinstein).
94. See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (discussing many victims’ fear of retaliation by Weinstein
if they reported his misconduct and observing that “[s]peaking up could have been costly”); Farrow, supra
note 1 (echoing victims’ concerns regarding retaliation by Weinstein).
95. Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (quoting victim Ashley Judd’s remark
that “[w]omen have been talking about Harvey amongst ourselves for a long time, and it’s simply beyond
time to have the conversation publicly”).
96. See Farrow, supra note 1.
97. See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 33.
98. See supra § II.A.
99. See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 33.
100. See Miller, supra note 10 (citations omitted).
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views harassment, the employer may be able to convey to its workers the extent
to which such behavior will not be tolerated.
2. Changing the Workplace Culture by Creating Concrete Negative
Ramifications for Misbehavior
In addition to modeling a serious and sober approach to workplace
harassment, organizations can change their workplace cultures to make
harassment less prevalent by creating significant and concrete negative
ramifications for such misconduct. As one group of researchers has advised,
“organizations need to spell out the stakes of what’s to be lost with
harassment.”101 These researchers recommend linking such misbehavior to
specified negative outcomes, and claim that highly publicized negative
ramifications for harassers signal to employers and employees just what the
stakes are related to their workplace behavior.102 They note, for example, the
impact of television host Matt Lauer losing his reported $20 million salary as a
result of his alleged workplace sexual misconduct, asserting that “[w]hen the
risks are tied to bank accounts and budgets, powerful people are more inclined
to listen.”103 Again, the EEOC has backed up this research, advising “at all levels,
across all positions, an organization must have systems in place that hold
employees accountable . . . [by] ensur[ing] that those who engage in harassment
are held responsible in a meaningful, appropriate, and proportional
manner . . . .”104
Publicizing the negative ramifications for harassment can further nudge a
workplace toward cultural change. If employees know the risks for misbehavior
and know about examples where those consequences have been implemented,
they may think twice about engaging in such conduct. One attorney who leads
sexual harassment training for his corporate clients has observed that top
executives at the firms with which he works have grown more open to one-onone coaching, perhaps in part because recent headlines regarding workplace
harassment have served as a reminder of the financial stakes associated with this

101. Mary Slaughter, Khalil Smith & David Rock, The Brain Science That Could Help Explain
Sexual Harassment, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/yourbrain-work/201802/the-brain-science-could-help-explain-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/NW8956HW].
102. See id.; Peter J. Henning, Taxpayers are Subsidizing Hush Money for Sexual Harassment and
Assault, CONVERSATION (Nov. 5, 2017), https://theconversation.com/taxpayers-are-subsidizing-hushmoney-for-sexual-harassment-and-assault-86451 [https://perma.cc/PHQ8-VJXJ] (arguing that “[o]ne
way to discourage corporate misconduct is to raise the cost of engaging in it”).
103. Slaughter et al., supra note 101; see Greg Price, Matt Lauer Net Worth: Disgraced NBC Host
Loses Huge Salary After Firing, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/lauer-networth-salary-millions725524?lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_pulse_read%3BvagC5wteRHmb7xtnmRmJvg%3D%
3D [https://perma.cc/8DGN-2UBZ].
104. EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 31.
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behavior.105 In the view of this attorney, “[t]he economic reality of [workplace
sexual harassment] is hitting home more than it ever has.”106
In many employment settings, however, publicizing the negative
ramifications of harassment seems to butt up against a culture of secrecy, where
even those workers with a known record for inappropriate behavior find their
misconduct shielded from public view.107 Sometimes this secrecy works to
protect the company, whether from any legal consequences associated with
employing the wrongdoer, or from the reputational harm resulting from not
taking action sooner.108 Sometimes this secrecy may flow out of contractual
obligations, such as when management quietly settles harassment claims brought
by employees, simultaneously demanding confidentiality as part of any such
settlement.109 Sometimes the secrecy flows directly out of the harasser’s position
of power, as seemed to be the case in Weinstein’s situation.110 As previously
noted, Weinstein reportedly enforced a code of silence throughout his company,
barring any criticism that could harm the company’s or leaders’ reputations.111
Eliminating such imposed silence and making public any credible allegations of
harassment can communicate to members of the organization (including those

105.

See McGregor, supra note 64.
Id. Of course, various privacy restrictions might prevent the public disclosure of specific
examples of negative ramifications for harassment. For example, concerns about tort claims for invasion
of privacy might restrict the disclosure of this information. See, e.g., Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112,
115 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that “[a]lthough employment information regarding a competing
candidate . . . is subject to discovery . . . , personnel files are confidential and discovery should be
limited”) (citation omitted). State statutes likewise seem to contemplate access to personnel information
by the employees to whom such information relates, but not access by outsiders without an employee’s
permission (absent a subpoena or other court order). See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5(a) (Deering 2019).
Finally, a host of contractual restrictions—from settlement agreements containing confidentiality
provisions to nondisclosure and/or non-disparagement agreements—might limit the employer’s ability to
make specific examples of harassment public. See, e.g., S.B. 1300, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019)
(prohibiting employers in some circumstances from requiring employees to sign non-disparagement
agreements that preclude employees from disclosing information about unlawful acts in the workplace,
including sexual harassment).
107. See John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men, 17 SEX ROLES 269, 271 (1987)
(citing research indicating that “sexual harassers typically have reputations for sexually exploitative
behaviors”).
108. See LaMagna I, supra note 7 (arguing that “[o]ne major reason why repeat offenders can
continue harassing for years [is that s]ome employers are reluctant to share information about a sexual
harasser because they are embarrassed it took them so long to fire him”).
109. See Kari Paul & Maria LaMagna, The Damaging, Incalculable Price of Sexual Harassment,
MARKETWATCH (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/as-harvey-weinstein-takes-a-leaveof-absence-heres-how-much-sexual-harassment-costs-companies-and-victims-2017-10-07
[https://perma.cc/BQE5-84JY] (hereinafter “LaMagna II”) (quoting a law professor who suggests that
“[w]hen alleged perpetrators are prominent at their companies, employers sometimes decide it’s worth
settling with alleged victims rather than getting rid of the perpetrator”); see, e.g., Kantor & Twohey, supra
note 1 (noting that there have been at least eight settlements between Weinstein and women who he has
allegedly harassed).
110. See Farrow, supra note 1 (citing victim who posited that everyone in Hollywood knew about
Weinstein’s harassment “[b]ut everyone’s too scared to say anything”).
111. See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
106.

2020

DISGORGING HARVEY WEINSTEIN’S SALARY

303

who might potentially engage in sexual misbehavior) that the organization takes
seriously this type of misconduct and will not tolerate it within the workplace.112
To be sure, some research disputes the efficacy of using negative
ramifications to try and change behavior, indicating instead that rewards or
positive reinforcement play a larger role in encouraging individuals to undertake
significant change.113 But even if “shaming” or “punishing” may not alter the
behavior of an individual harasser, publicizing the negative consequences that
flow from misbehavior might shift the culture within an organization as a whole:
The public imposition of negative ramifications—particularly negative financial
ramifications—upon those who engage in harassment demonstrates to an
organization’s employees and to the broader public that harassment is not part of
the “patterns of accepted behavior” that form the culture in this particular
workplace.114 Moreover, as potential targets and victims of harassment observe
that their organization takes such behavior seriously by imposing negative
consequences on employees who engage in such misconduct, they may be more
willing to speak up themselves when faced with such inappropriate conduct.115
Thus, even if individual harassers find themselves personally unchanged by
these negative consequences, those individuals may soon come to understand
that they no longer fit within the culture of the organization that refuses to permit
behavior such as theirs.

3. Changing the Workplace Culture by Altering the Power Structure
within an Organization
In addition to modeling a serious and sober approach to harassment and
implementing concrete negative ramifications for misbehavior, employers also
can transform the culture of their workplace by modifying the broader power
structure within their organization. Research bears out that the balance of power
within an organization impacts the extent to which that organization’s culture
tolerates (and even encourages) harassment. As one set of researchers has
observed, “harassment flourishes in workplaces where men dominate in
management and women have little power.”116 These researchers likewise posit

112. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Public Shaming of Workplace Harassers May Force Employers to
Stop Protecting Them, CONVERSATION (Nov. 8, 2017), https://theconversation.com/public-shaming-ofworkplace-harassers-may-force-employers-to-stop-protecting-them-87139
[https://perma.cc/ZXD9EYXR]. Having corporations show public support for victims of harassment not only might minimize the
instances of harassment, but also might minimize the negative impact on victims. See generally Slaughter
et al., supra note 101 (noting that “cynicism from leadership regarding sexual misconduct can lead to what
clinical psychologists refer to as ‘institutional betrayal’—where the trauma of an assault is compounded
by bureaucratic incompetence or opposition or indifference from management”) (citation omitted).
113. See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 74 (positing that “[p]eople will change their behavior if they
see the new behavior as easy, rewarding and normal.”)
114. See id.
115. See Tippett, supra note 112.
116. Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 65.
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that harassment arises in organizations where few women occupy “core”
positions.117 Accordingly, companies could decrease harassment in their
workplaces if they hired and promoted women in greater numbers.118
Researchers already have established that access to power alters the manner
in which an individual thinks. In one study, researchers found that “elevated
power increases the psychological distance that an individual feels from
others.”119 Other studies have found that “powerful people consider others’
perspectives less.”120 Power increases individuals’ anticipation of rewards while
decreasing their perceptions of threat,121 “increases individuals’ optimism in
viewing risks” and heightens “their propensity to engage in risky behavior,”122
and “prompts people to perceive sexual interest” when none actually is
present.123 Furthermore, individuals with greater access to power show greater
likelihood to behave in an impulsive manner, which can manifest in such
individuals violating workplace ethical rules.124 In one experiment, researchers
observed “participants in power [taking] candy from children without blinking
an eye.”125 Examining findings like this, the EEOC Task Force Report observed
“superstar status can be a breeding ground for harassment.”126
Without question, with his tremendous resources, broad networks of
influence, and virtually limitless control within the Weinstein Company, Harvey
Weinstein fell squarely into this description of the superstar employee.
Moreover, if even only some of the accounts of Weinstein’s inappropriate
behavior are true, his behavior fits perfectly within the laundry list of traits noted
above: He either never considered whether the women whom he accosted had
any sexual interest in him, or mistakenly perceived interest despite its utter
absence; he appeared to focus almost entirely on the “reward” (the sexual
117.

See id.
See id. (observing that “[i]n industries and workplaces where women are well represented in
the core jobs, harassment is significantly less likely to occur”); Miller, supra note 10 (noting that
companies employing greater numbers of women in management experience less sexual harassment).
119. Pamela Smith & Yaacov Trope, You Focus on the Forest When You’re In Charge of the Trees:
Power Priming and Abstract Information Processing, 90 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., No. 4,
578, 578 (2006); see Slaughter et al., supra note 101 (discussing Smith & Trope study).
120. Slaughter et al., supra note 101 (citations omitted); see Dacher Keltner, Sex, Power, and the
Systems That Enable Men Like Harvey Weinstein, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/10/sex-power-and-the-systems-that-enable-men-like-harvey-weinstein
[https://perma.cc/E7JB-YLDV] (observing that individuals in powerful groups may develop “empathy
deficits” and be less able to read others’ emotions and/or understand others’ perspectives).
121. See Cameron Anderson & Jennifer L. Berdahl, The Experience of Power: Examining the Effects
of Power on Approach and Inhibition Tendencies, 83 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., No. 6, 1362,
1373–74 (2002); see Slaughter et al., supra note 101.
122. Cameron Anderson & Adam D. Galinsky, Power, Optimism, and Risk-Taking, 36 EUR. J. OF
SOC. PSYCHOL., 511, 529 (2006); Slaughter et al., supra note 101.
123. Slaughter et al., supra note 101; see Keltner, supra note 120 (discussing how power can
“manifest in inappropriate sexual behavior in male-dominated contexts”).
124. Keltner, supra note 120; see EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 24 (asserting that
“privilege can lead to a self-view that they are above the rules, which can foster mistreatment”).
125. Keltner, supra note 120.
126. EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 24.
118.
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conquest), while assuming that any “threat”—whether it be legal liability or bad
publicity—would be dealt with by his vast staff of underlings; he manifested an
inherent belief that he was “above the rules” that applied to everyone else.127
Weinstein’s almost omnipotent presence within the company also ensured the
absence of any real check on his behavior: The Weinstein Company’s Board
readily accepted excuses for his misdeeds,128 and the company’s human
resources department was described as “a place where you went to when you
didn’t want anything to get done . . . [b]ecause everything funneled back to
Harvey.”129
Of course, simply altering the power structure within an organization will
not serve as an automatic fix for the dynamics that contribute to sexual
harassment at work. But, allowing women to fill more significant roles would
give potential victims of workplace sexual misconduct (who are predominantly
female)130 more allies at the top of the corporate hierarchy,131 while also
providing leaders who are “more likely to be watchfully present in the contexts
in which the powerful abuse power.”132 Moreover, placing women into positions
of power can alter the workplace culture in a much more fundamental way, by
more generally curbing the marginalization of women at work.133 The impact of
such a shift in perception could be significant: Weinstein’s own attorney, in
endeavoring to explain her client’s behavior, referred to Weinstein as “an old
dinosaur learning new ways.”134 Perhaps shaking up the corporate hierarchy to
increase the power and authority of women—and to remove power from men
who abuse such authority—would more effectively drive home to “old
dinosaurs” like Weinstein that misbehavior which might have gone unnoticed in
the past no longer will be tolerated by those in power.135
127.

See Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
129. Farrow, supra note 1 (quoting a former female executive at the Weinstein Company).
130. See Chatterjee, supra note 8 (reporting that (1) 81% of women, compared to 43% of men, claim
to have experienced some form of sexual harassment, and (2) 38% of women have report being harassed
in the workplace); cf. Wan, supra note 88 (noting that it is “almost always men doing the harassing”).
131. See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 28 (citing the existence of significant power
disparities in a workplace as a risk factor leading to harassment); cf. id. at 26 (observing that “sexual
harassment of women is more likely to occur in workplaces that have primarily male employees”).
132. Keltner, supra note 120.
133. See Jessica Fink, Gender Sidelining and the Problem of Unactionable Discrimination, 29 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 100–03 (2018) (citations omitted).
134. Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
135. This effort to alter the power structure within an organization and to include women in greater
numbers must involve more than a mere image or illusion of promoting and valuing women. Rather, there
must be substance behind this position, actually providing women with meaningful power. Indeed,
Weinstein himself has long positioned himself as a “liberal lion [and] a champion of women,” see Kantor
& Twohey, supra note 1, even producing a documentary on campus sexual assault and helping to endow
a faculty chair at Rutgers University in Gloria Steinem’s name, see id. Yet without providing women
within his organization with actual power—the power to model appropriate treatment of women in the
workplace and to successfully demand change in the face of inappropriate conduct—such shallow nods
to gender equality lack any real impact. See id. (observing that, simultaneous with Weinstein’s
humanitarian efforts, “[d]ozens of Mr. Weinstein’s former and current employees, from assistants to top
128.
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III. USING THE FAITHLESS SERVANT DOCTRINE AND OTHER DISGORGEMENT
STRATEGIES TO HIT HARASSERS WHERE IT HURTS (I.E., IN THEIR WALLETS)
While multiple experts seem to agree that a key to decreasing sexual
harassment at work involves changing the culture of a workplace to render such
behavior intolerable, uncertainty remains regarding how best to effectuate such
a cultural change. What specific steps can organizations take to model a serious
and sober approach to harassment, to create concrete negative ramifications for
such behavior, and/or to alter the broader power structure in the workplace?
When carefully-worded harassment policies and sophisticated harassment
training sessions fail, might there be an opportunity to use a less conventional
approach to drive this message home to an organization’s employees—both to
perpetrators of harassment and to those in the workplace who merely observe
such behavior? Faced with such daunting questions, this paper examines one
novel possibility: whether a fairly unusual approach to addressing sexual
harassment at work might have an impact on reducing this phenomenon.
Specifically, this paper asks whether a little-discussed doctrine of remedies law
called the faithless servant doctrine, along with similar compensation forfeiture
tools, could present one way for companies to convey more effectively to their
employees their refusal to countenance harassment at work, perhaps altering the
overall culture of the workplace.
At its most basic level, the faithless servant doctrine holds that “an agent is
entitled to no compensation for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach
of his or her duty of loyalty.”136 The duty of loyalty “requires fiduciaries to
exercise their authority in a good-faith attempt to advance corporate purposes . . .
[and] prohibits fiduciaries from putting their own interests ahead of those of the
shareholders.”137 The bad faith that forms the basis of a duty of loyalty breach
“can result from any emotion [that] may cause a director to [intentionally] place
his own interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare of the corporation,
including hatred, lust, envy, revenge.”138 For example, an executive may breach
their duty of loyalty by consciously causing the corporation to violate the law,139
or by failing to exercise proper oversight over the corporation.140 Under the

executives, said they knew of inappropriate conduct while they worked for him [but o]nly a handful said
they ever confronted him”).
136. Van Arsdale, supra note 13, § 2.
137. Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1583, 1629 (2018) (hereinafter “Hemel & Lund II”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see
also Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d 862, 869 (N.J. 2015) (observing that “[a]n employee must not while
employed act contrary to the employer’s interest” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
138. Meena Yoo, Corporate Governance in a Post-Weinstein Era, FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L.
(Jan. 6, 2018), https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/01/06/corporate-governance-in-a-post-weinsteinera [https://perma.cc/6UGR-22J9] (citations and internal quotations omitted).
139. See Hemel & Lund II, supra note 137, at 1630.
140. See id.; Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (describing potential for board liability for breach of
the duty of loyalty for exposing a company to unreasonable financial risk, whether negligently or with
intent).
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faithless servant doctrine, these types of disloyal or deceitful employees must
forgo their compensation during any period of faithlessness.141
Importantly, the faithless servant doctrine is grounded in restitution, not in
compensation.142 Therefore, its focus is not on making a plaintiff-employer
whole from its losses, but rather on disgorging the defendant-employee’s
wrongful gain.143 Moreover, while the idea of forfeiture actually dates back
centuries, with deep roots in the law of equity,144 modern courts have applied
these forfeiture concepts with some frequency not just to ensure that an employer
is made whole with respect to any loss caused by an employee’s breach of her
fiduciary duties,145 but also to deter any further disloyalty by the employee, by
disgorging any profits that might have flowed out of such a breach.146
While the contours of the faithless servant doctrine can vary significantly
from one jurisdiction to the next,147 and while some jurisdictions might refer to
the remedy more generally as “disgorgement” or “forfeiture,” rather than as the
“faithless servant doctrine,”148 the underlying notion of using compensation
forfeiture to respond to wrongful conduct by employees who breach their
fiduciary duties remains a theme throughout this area of the law. Applied across
a broad range of cases and circumstances—whatever name may be used to
reference the doctrine—these tools represent powerful means of addressing

141.

Van Arsdale, supra note 13, § 2.
See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay on Restoration of Executive
Compensation, 12 UNIV. PA. J. BUS. L. 1135, 1136 (2010).
143. See Dobbs, supra note 14, § 4.1(1) (describing restitution as “a return or restoration of what the
defendant has gained in a transaction”); More on Faithless Servants, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Jan. 29,
2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2010/01/more-on-faithless-servants.html
[https://perma.cc/4829-PGSM] (characterizing forfeiture as “a one-way restitution claim since the
employee can’t seek to recover in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the services he did render”);
FRIEBERGER HABER LLP, What is the Faithless Servant Doctrine and Why is it a Potent Weapon for
Employers?, (Nov. 29, 2016), https://fhnylaw.com/faithless-servant-doctrine-potent-weapon-employers/
[https://perma.cc/6GFQ-VH4V] (observing that, under the faithless servant doctrine, a breaching
employee “must forfeit all compensation earned since the first date of employment, even though the
employee’s services may have otherwise benefitted the employer . . . ,” and characterizing any value that
an employee may have provided to the employer through his or her loyal services as “irrelevant”).
144. See George P. Roach, Compensation Forfeiture: Stacking Remedies Against Disloyal Agents
and Employees, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 249, 251 (2015) (observing that “[t]he principles underlying
compensation forfeiture against disloyal fiduciaries date back in the law of equity to before 1600”).
145. See Dobbs, supra note 14, § 3.1 (observing that “[t]he stated goal of [] damages[] is
compensation of the plaintiff for legally recognized losses . . . [in] an effort to put the plaintiff in his or
her rightful position”); Roach, supra note 144, at 307–08 (discussing the goal of disgorgement which is
“compensation, punishment, and deterrence”) (citations omitted).
146. See Karen Rubin, Disloyal GC’s Can Be Required to Disgorge Salary, Says NJ High Court—
Even if No Economic Harm, LAW FOR LAWYERS TODAY (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.thelawforlawyerstoday.com/2015/11/disloyal-gcs-can-be-required-to-disgorge-salary-saysnj-high-court/ [https://perma.cc/GW8G-PG4A] (discussing deterrent effect of disgorgement).
147. See infra § III.B.2.
148. See Roach, supra note 144, at 304–09 (noting that “[c]ompensation forfeiture is sometimes
equated to the faithless servant doctrine . . . ,” and that “forfeiture is a remedy in equity that resembles
disgorgement as they both share the driving rationale of denying unjust enrichment to a disloyal
fiduciary”).
142.
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fiduciary breaches by workers.149 Moreover, while many cases that apply these
principles deal with financial wrongdoing and/or other instances of usurping
corporate opportunities, there is at least some precedent for disgorging an
employee’s compensation when their breach consists of sexual misconduct at
work.
To be sure, applying the faithless servant doctrine to a situation involving
sexual harassment by an employee would require, as a predicate matter,
establishing that engaging in sexual harassment actually constitutes a breach of
the employee’s fiduciary duties. Courts admittedly have reached mixed
conclusions in this respect. In Pozner v. Fox Broadcasting Company, the court
asserted that there was no precedent for allowing “sexual harassment by an
executive, without more, [to form] the basis of a breach of the duty of loyalty
claim.”150 Other courts, however, have seemed somewhat more amenable to this
argument.151 More importantly, engaging in sexual harassment seems to fit
squarely within how courts have conceived of fiduciary duty breaches more
broadly: If courts assume that acting in a manner that cuts against the company’s
best interests constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty,152 then an employee who
sexually harasses employees or others connected with the company clearly seems
to fall within such a prohibition.153
As discussed in greater detail below, however, the faithless servant doctrine
and other compensation forfeiture tools may be a fairly clumsy way of addressing
sexual harassment in some contexts: While some aspects of these doctrines
render them an appropriate response to misconduct like Weinstein’s, other
aspects of the Weinstein scandal—particularly, the Weinstein Company’s own
apparent complicity in Weinstein’s wrongdoing—raise significant questions
about the applicability of these powerful tools to bad actors like Weinstein.
Where the employer who would benefit from any compensation disgorgement
ignored (and perhaps even permitted) the underlying breach of fiduciary duties

149. Notably, while it sometimes is assumed that only high-level employees within an organization
owe fiduciary duties to an employer, in fact all employees—even lower level workers—may be held to
have a duty of loyalty toward their employers. See J. Robert Smith, Fiduciary Duties of Employees,
HOLLAND
&
HART:
FIDUCIARY
LAW
BLOG
(Nov.
3,
2014),
https://www.fiduciarylawblog.com/2014/11/fiduciary-duties-of-employees.html [https://perma.cc/684TXVB7] (observing that even “low-level” employees owe fiduciary duties to their employer); see Eckard
Brandes, Inc. v. Riley, 338 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even “low-level” or “ordinary”
employees may have duty of loyalty toward employer (citations omitted)).
150. Pozner v. Fox Broadcasting Company, 74 N.Y.S.3d 711, 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
151. See Hemel & Lund II, supra note 137, at 1623–25 (discussing derivative action alleging breach
of duty of loyalty brought against company and former CEO based upon former CEO’s sexual misconduct
and direction that the company expend resources to further his sexual relations); see also id. at 1624
(quoting the Chancellor’s observation that “[t]he complaint clearly . . . states a sufficiently colorable claim
that Hewitt breached his fiduciary duty by engaging in conduct that led to his termination” (citation
omitted)).
152. See Yoo, supra note 138.
153. See id. (observing that “[b]y sexually harassing employees and potential employees, Weinstein
abused his position of power . . . [and h]is conduct can only be described as self-serving at the risk of the
Weinstein Company’s business interests”) (citations omitted).
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to take place, as the Weinstein Company may have done here, there may be
serious concerns about applying these forfeiture principles without some
significant modifications that would divert any gains away from the complicit
employer and toward the victims of the sexual misconduct and/or the company’s
shareholders.

A. Astra, USA v. Bildman: A Case Study in the Faithless Servant
Doctrine Applied to the Sexual Harassment Context
Perhaps more than any other case in which the faithless servant doctrine has
been applied, the 1981 case of Astra, USA v. Bildman demonstrates the power of
this doctrine to respond to high-level executives like Harvey Weinstein who
engage in sexual and other misconduct at work.154 In 1981, Astra
Pharmaceuticals (“Astra”) hired Lars Bildman to serve as its president and chief
executive officer, as well as to serve as a member of the board of directors of two
of its subsidiaries.155 For more than 15 years, Bildman performed well in his
position, successfully implementing corporate strategy, effecting significant
management changes, and overseeing substantial growth within the company.156
During the final five years of his employment, “[f]rom 1991 through 1996,
Astra’s overall profit met or exceeded” established goals, and Bildman’s
compensation unsurprisingly increased.157
In late 1995, Astra learned of allegations that Bildman and other members
of Astra senior management had been engaged in workplace sexual
harassment.158 Among the charges that eventually emerged were allegations by
a former secretary who had received a payoff and left the company after Bildman
had forced her into sexual relations,159 as well as settlement payments to at least
three other female employees who alleged that Bildman had sexually harassed
them.160 In addition to denying any allegations of harassment,161 Bildman refused
to cooperate with Astra’s investigation and took various steps to stymie the
investigation’s progress, including by asking former and current Astra
employees to deny that he ever had acted improperly and directing a colleague
to shred corporate documents and erase company computers.162
Despite Bildman’s efforts at obstruction and cover-up, reports ultimately
indicated a dozen instances of women being fondled or solicited for sexual favors
by Bildman or other Astra executives during Bildman’s fifteen-year tenure at

154.

914 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. 2009).
Id. at 40.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 41.
159. See id. at 40–41.
160. See id. at 41.
161. See id. at 42 (citing Bildman’s assertion that he and others in senior management had “very
good records” concerning sexual harassment).
162. See id. at 42–43.
155.
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Astra,163 leading the Astra Board of Directors to rescind Bildman’s employment
contract and terminate him for cause.164 The EEOC also filed a complaint against
Astra alleging a pattern and practice of sexual harassment against female workers
at the company—a complaint that Astra ultimately settled (without admitting
liability) by establishing a $9,850,000 victim compensation fund.165 Astra
subsequently sued Bildman on a number of grounds, including fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and breach of the duties of good faith and loyalty.166 After the
jury found Bildman liable for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, the trial court
ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Bildman’s compensation
during the five year period of his disloyalty exceeded the value of the services
that he had provided to Astra, thus justifying the disgorgement of his pay.167
When the trial judge declined to order such disgorgement, Astra appealed,
arguing that the court should require Bildman to forfeit all of the salary and
bonuses that he received during the period in which he was disloyal to the
company—an amount in excess of $5 million.168
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, applying New
York Law, held that the faithless servant doctrine should require Bildman to
forfeit all of the salary and bonuses that he received during this five-year
period.169 The court explained that “an agent is held to . . . utmost fidelity in his
dealings with his principal, and if he acts adversely to his employer in any part
of the transaction . . . , it amounts to such a fraud upon the principal, as to forfeit
any right to compensation for services.”170 Relying upon additional precedent,
the court observed that “one who owes a duty of fidelity to a principal and who
is faithless in the performance of his or her services is generally not entitled to
recover compensation, whether commissions or salary.”171 Moreover, the court
observed that this forfeiture would apply regardless of the value of the services
that the employee might have provided during the period of the disloyalty.
Indeed, the court declared that a faithless servant should lose the right to recover
compensation, “even if he otherwise performed valuable services for the
principal.”172

B. Disgorging Compensation Beyond Astra: Additional Examples of
163.

See id. at 43.
See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 44.
167. See id. at 44–45.
168. See id. at 45–46.
169. See id. at 46.
170. Id. at 47 (citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).
171. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Soam Corp. v. Trane Co., 608 N.Y.S.2d
177, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“An agent is held to utmost good faith in his dealings with his principal,
and forfeits any right to compensation for his services if he acts adversely to his employer.”).
172. Astra USA, 914 N.E.2d at 47; see also id. (“Nor does it make any difference that the services
were beneficial to the principal, or that the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the breach
of fidelity by the agent.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
164.
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Compensation Forfeiture173
While Astra provides one illustration of the faithless servant doctrine
applied to sexual misconduct, various other cases have applied this sort of
restitutionary theory to disgorge compensation from wrongdoing employees
more generally. While some courts specifically refer to the faithless servant
doctrine as the basis for this disgorgement, others refer to “forfeiture” or
“disgorgement” to achieve the same result: the paying back of some or all
compensation received by an employee who has breached his or her fiduciary
duties.174
1. Cases Applying Compensation Forfeiture to Fiduciary Breaches
In a variety of cases, courts have applied concepts of compensation
forfeiture to disgorge the salary and/or benefits of faithless fiduciaries. In
Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., an investment banker was found to
have breached his duties of loyalty and good faith by failing to disclose
substantial compensation and opportunities that he had received through serving
on various outside boards of directors.175 Rather than focus on the extent to which
the banker’s misconduct may have harmed his former employer—what would
have been the focus of a compensatory damages inquiry176—the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals required the banker to forfeit all compensation that he received
from his employer following the date upon which his disloyalty began.177 In so
doing, the court explicitly rejected the trial judge’s decision to only require the
banker to forfeit part of his compensation in response to his breach.178 Instead,
the Second Circuit held that New York law would require a complete
disgorgement of all compensation that the banker had received following the date
upon which his disloyalty began.179 According to the Second Circuit, “[i]t does
not make any difference that the services rendered [by the breaching employee]
were beneficial to the principal, or that the principal suffered no provable
173. This section includes a description of how various jurisdictions have applied concepts of
compensation disgorgement and/or forfeiture, with some courts adopting more stringent approaches than
others. It is difficult to discern whether there is any “majority view” regarding the best manner in which
to apply these concepts (and, if so, what that majority view might be). Nonetheless, as described in greater
detail herein, these compensation disgorgement and/or forfeiture principles would seem to apply to
misconduct like Weinstein’s even in jurisdictions that adopt a more rigid or limited view of these
doctrines. See infra notes 217–20, 239 and accompanying text, § III.C.
174. Other courts discuss this disgorgement in terms of “equitable clawback.” See, e.g., Warren,
supra note 142, at 1136 (equating “equitable clawback” with the forfeiture of compensation inherent in
the Faithless Servant Doctrine”). Agency principles also reflect notions of disgorgement, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (AM. LAW INST. 1958), and the Restatement of Employment
Law similarly echoes this view, see RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(c) (AM. LAW. INST.
2019).
175. 344 F.3d 184, 189–95 (2d Cir. 2003).
176. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
177. See Phansalkar, 334 F.3d at 208.
178. See id. at 199–200.
179. See id. at 200.
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damages as a result of the breach of fidelity . . . .”180 Rather, the employee’s
breaches of loyalty and good faith toward his employer themselves were
sufficient to warrant a forfeiture of compensation.181
In Enstar v. Grassgreen, Richard Grassgreen, a senior executive at KinderCare, Inc., was found liable for breach of fiduciary duties related to a wide array
of financial improprieties that occurred over a five year period of time.182 After
the jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Grassgreen’s former
employer initially totaling almost $20 million,183 the Alabama federal district
court confronted the equitable issues in the case,184 including Enstar’s demand
for forfeiture and recovery of all compensation that Grassgreen received during
the entire five-year period of his breach of fiduciary duties.185 The court held that
Grassgreen should be required to forfeit all of the compensation paid to him by
Enstar during this period—an amount that totaled over $5.4 million.186 In
reaching this conclusion, the court rejected Grassgreen’s argument that the court
should impose only a partial forfeiture because “regardless of what he may have
done wrong, he worked diligently on behalf of the corporation and the
corporation profited from his work.”187 Instead, the court relied upon prior 10th
Circuit authority which had held that “an agent who acts for his own benefit is
not entitled to compensation which otherwise would be due him . . . , even if he
thinks his actions will benefit the principal.”188 In the court’s view, applying such
a stringent remedy to a breaching fiduciary like Grassgreen would emphasize the
need for corporate officers and directors to execute their duties appropriately, in
the best interests of the company.189
In Kaye v. Rosefielde, the Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly indicated
that the disgorgement of a faithless fiduciary’s compensation could constitute a
proper remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty.190 In Kaye, the defendant—a former
chief operating officer and de facto general counsel for the plaintiff—not only
engaged in various acts of financial misconduct during his employment with the

180.

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
See id.
182. 812 F. Supp. 1562, 1565–71 (M.D. Ala. 1993); see also Roach, supra note 144, at 256–61.
183. See Enstar, 812 F. Supp. at 1569. Specifically, the jury set compensatory damages at just over
$1.9 million and initially awarded $18 million in punitive damages, see id., an amount that the court
remitted to $10 million, see id. at 1582.
184. See Dobbs, supra note 14, § 2.6(2) (noting general rule that right to jury trial applies only to
“common law” actions and not to equitable suits); see also Enstar, 812 F. Supp. at 1571 (noting that “the
parties agreed [these] were not claims for which a right to jury trial existed”).
185. See Enstar, 812 F. Supp. at 1571.
186. See id. at 1575.
187. Id. at 1573.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1574 (deeming it “of crucial importance to the economic well-being of this country
for corporate officers and directors to understand without question that in the discharge of the duties of
their offices they must subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the corporation which they
serve”).
190. 121 A.3d 862, 873–74 (N.J. 2015).
181.
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plaintiff, but also made multiple inappropriate sexual advances toward
colleagues, thus subjecting the plaintiff to a risk of sexual harassment liability.191
In describing the ways in which the defendant breached his duty of loyalty, the
trial court specifically cited, in addition to the defendant’s financial self-dealing,
his “inappropriate conduct toward female employees.”192 Reversing the trial
court, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that disgorgement of some portion of
the defendant’s compensation during the periods of his disloyalty might be
appropriate.193 In reaching this conclusion, the Kaye court specified the factors
that courts should take into account in determining whether—and to what
extent— disgorgement should apply to the compensation of a disloyal
fiduciary:194 Courts should consider “the employee’s degree of responsibility and
level of compensation, the number of acts of disloyalty, the extent to which those
acts placed the employer’s business in jeopardy, and the degree of planning to
undermine the employer that is undertaken by the employee.”195
Thus, precedent across several jurisdictions supports responding to
breaches of fiduciary duty by disgorging at least some of the compensation of
the breaching employee.196 While by no means the “law of the land” when a court
is faced with such misconduct—these cases admittedly serve as isolated
examples of this approach—these disgorgement principles represent a powerful
(if somewhat novel) way of dealing with fiduciary breaches. Moreover, while the
vast majority of breaches that have triggered this disgorgement have involved
some financial impropriety by an employee, cases like Astra and Kaye make
clear that this remedy may also apply when the breaching employee has engaged
in egregious workplace sexual harassment.
2. The Varying Contours of Compensation Disgorgement
While various courts have turned to compensation forfeiture to address
wrongdoing by a fiduciary, different courts have adopted different rules in
191.

Id. at 864–66.
Id. at 865.
193. See id. at 874–75. Notably, in reaching this conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not
specifically refer to the defendant’s sexual misconduct as the basis for this remedy, but rather appeared to
rely on the defendant’s misconduct more broadly. See id.
194. Id. at 874.
195. Id.
196. For additional examples of cases applying compensation disgorgement as a remedy, see,
e.g.,William Floyd Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Wright, 877 N.Y.S.2d 395 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (allowing
forfeiture of all of defendants’ compensation, including by relieving employer of obligation to pay
defendants’ health, life and dental insurance premiums, after defendants engaged in theft and
embezzlement); Bon Temps Agency Ltd. v. Greenfield, 445 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(endorsing compensation forfeiture against manager at placement agency who breached fiduciary and
contractual duties and observing that “a disloyal employee is not entitled to receive compensation, whether
commissions or salary”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Soam Corp. v. Trane Co., 608
N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (refuting characterization of compensation forfeiture as an
‘unconscionable penalty’ by observing that New York law “mandates the forfeiture of all compensation,
whether commissions or salary, where, as here, one who owes a duty of fidelity to a principal is faithless
in the performance of his services”) (citations omitted).
192.
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defining the contours of when and how to disgorge compensation from faithless
employees.

a. Differing views regarding the amount of harm that an employer
must suffer in order to trigger disgorgement
One area in which courts differ in applying disgorgement relates to the
degree of harm that an employer must suffer before the court will disgorge
compensation from a breaching fiduciary. Some courts have held that an
employer need not establish proof of any direct damage or loss arising out of the
employee’s faithless performance; proof of the employee’s disloyalty alone
serves as a sufficient bass for the forfeiture of compensation.197 Indeed, in the
view of some courts, the fact that an employer actually profited from an
employee’s work during the period of the employee’s disloyalty will not prevent
or limit the application of disgorgement.198 In Astra, for example, during the
period of Bildman’s misconduct, the overall profits of the company that Bildman
oversaw met or exceeded its established goals.199 Yet in allowing the
disgorgement of Bildman’s compensation, the court observed that the faithless
servant doctrine requires an employee to forfeit his compensation “even if he
otherwise performed valuable services for the principal.”200 In the court’s view,
“[n]or does it make any difference that the services were beneficial to the
principal, or that the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the
breach. . . .”201
The Enstar court mirrored this analysis, emphatically dismissing the
employee’s arguments that “his conduct . . . caused very little, if any, actual
damage to the corporation”202 and that his employer actually had made money
from the investments that formed the basis of the employee’s breach.203 To the
contrary, the court deemed irrelevant to its forfeiture analysis any proof
regarding the damage that the company may or may not have suffered as a result
of the employee’s breach.204 According to the court, it could no more question
whether Grassgreen’s conduct had harmed his former employer then it could

197. See Van Arsdale, supra note 13, §§ 2, 8; see also Feiger v. Iral Jewelry, Ltd., 363 N.E.2d 350,
351 (N.Y. 1977) (“Nor does it make any difference that the services were beneficial to the principal, or
that the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the breach of fidelity by the agent.”) (citations
omitted); Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2003); James R. Carroll &
Jason C. Weida, Faithless Servants Beware: Massachusetts Forfeiture Law is More Severe Than Astra
USA, Inc. v. Bildman Might Suggest, BOSTON BAR J. 7, 9 (2010).
198. See Feiger, supra note 198, at 351; Phansalkar, supra note 198, at 200.
199. Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Mass. 2009).
200. Id. at 47.
201. Id. (citations and quotations marks omitted).
202. Enstar Grp., Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F. Supp. 1562, 1574 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
203. See id.
204. See id.
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speculate regarding the benefits that Enstar would have accrued had Grassgreen
faithfully performed his duties.205
The court in Kaye v. Rosefielde reached a similar conclusion with respect to
the lack of any need for an employer to prove damages as a precursor to
disgorgement.206 In allowing the disgorgement of the employee’s salary in Kaye,
the court observed, “the remedy of equitable disgorgement is available to a trial
court even absent a finding that the employer sustained economic loss by virtue
of the employee’s disloyal conduct.”207 Rather than viewing disgorgement as a
way of making the employer whole for any economic loss caused by the
breaching employee, the court seemed to view this remedy as being directed
more toward altering the behavior of disloyal employees.208 Citing the possible
deterrent impact of this remedy, the court noted “its availability signals [to]
agents that some adverse consequences will follow a breach of fiduciary duty.”209
Other courts, however, adhere to a more limited view, disgorging an
employee’s compensation only when the employer can establish that the
employee’s breach actually caused damage to the employer,210 or when an
employee’s disloyalty is related to his or her job duties.211 In Sanders v. Madison
Square Garden, L.P., the New York Knickerbockers (“Knicks”) basketball team
claimed that a former employee who previously held various high-level
marketing positions had been engaged in tax fraud and/or had been operating an
outside business during her employment by the Knicks.212 The team subsequently
sought to use the faithless servant doctrine to disgorge all of the compensation
that the employee had received during the period in which she allegedly engaged
in these wrongful activities.213 In denying the team’s motion for leave to amend
its answer to assert a counterclaim against the employee for breach of fiduciary
duty, a New York federal district court observed that “neither operating an
outside business nor unethical conduct unrelated to employment violates the
faithless servant doctrine unless such business or behavior adversely affects the

205.

See id.
121 A.3d 862, 864–65 (N.J. 2015).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 873.
209. Kaye, 121 A.3d at 873 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see Rubin, supra note 146
(characterizing the Kaye case as one “that’s bound to scare in-house counsel . . .”).
210. See, e.g., Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer, 289 N.W.2d 280, 287 (Wis. 1980) (holding that
“whether the agent should be denied all or any part of his compensation . . . depends on consideration and
evaluation of the relevant circumstances . . . includ[ing] . . . the loss, expenses and inconvenience caused
to the employer by the employee’s breach . . . .”); Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., No. 06 Civ.
589(GEL), 2007 WL 1933933, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2007) (declining to apply Faithless Servant
Doctrine where employer “conspicuously fails to identify any way in which it suffered any such
damage . . .”).
211. See Sanders, 2007 WL 1933933, at *7.
212. Id. at *1–2.
213. See id. at *3. Specifically, Sanders had brought a discrimination suit against the Knicks, and
the Knicks asserted the Faithless Servant Doctrine as part of a counterclaim against Sanders, having
discovered evidence of her alleged wrongful conduct during discovery related to Sanders’ lawsuit. See id.
206.
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employee’s job performance.”214 Here, the court observed, the employer had
failed to present any evidence that Sanders’ alleged misconduct negatively
impacted her performance.215 Instead, the court explicitly distinguished Sander’s
misconduct from that which had supported complete disgorgement in
Phansalkar, finding that—unlike the wrongdoing in Phansalkar—any alleged
misconduct by Sanders did not “permeate the employee’s service in its most
material and substantial part.”216
Even in these more restrictive jurisdictions, however, Weinstein’s conduct
undoubtedly would satisfy the requirement that an employer establish damages
from an employee’s breach of fiduciary duties; the Weinstein Company clearly
suffered tremendous harm as a result of Weinstein’s misbehavior. In fact, one
need not speculate regarding the potential harm that Weinstein’s conduct caused
to the Weinstein Company: Within weeks of the initial disclosures regarding his
behavior, one of the company’s largest creditors, AI International Holdings,
purportedly demanded an immediate repayment of a $45 million loan that it had
made to the Weinstein Company, and other parties that traditionally had worked
with the Weinstein Company—such as Apple and Amazon—distanced
themselves from the company.217 Within months, this once-multi-million dollar
company faced financial ruin and a raft of litigation.218

b. Differing views regarding the amount of compensation that an
employer can disgorge
Different jurisdictions also have adopted differing views regarding the
amount of compensation that an employer can disgorge when faced with
disloyalty by an employee. Some courts require a faithless servant to forfeit all
compensation that he or she received once the disloyalty commenced,219 or for
the entire period during which the employee’s disloyalty occurred.220 Such courts

214. Id. at *4 (citations omitted); see id. at *7 (finding Sanders’ alleged misconduct “[was] so far
removed from [her] job responsibilities that it cannot be said that the misconduct ‘substantially’ interfered
with her job performance”).
215. Id. at *4.
216. See id. at *5 (citing Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 203 (2nd Cir.
2003)). Similarly, in Feiger v. Iral Jewelry, the highest New York state court rejected an employer’s effort
to disgorge commissions from an employee who took initial steps to start a competitive business, noting
that plaintiff “never lessened his work on behalf of defendant and never misappropriated to his own use
any business secrets or special knowledge . . . .” 363 N.E.2d 350, 351 (N.Y. 1977) (citations omitted).
217. See Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32.
218. See infra § III.D; supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text; Farrow, supra note 1 (opining that
“Weinstein’s behavior deeply affected the day-to-day operations of his companies”).
219. See Van Arsdale, supra note 13, §§ 2, 12; cf. Astra USA, Inc., v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 47–
48 (Mass. 2009) (citing without endorsement cases articulating rule that “disloyal employees and agents
forfeit all compensation ever received from the employer”) (citations omitted).
220. See Carroll & Weida, supra note 197, at 9 (citing cases that confirm a court’s discretion to
impose “total forfeiture during the period of breach”) (citations omitted); Warren, supra note 142, at 1142
(observing that a majority of jurisdictions apply a “bright line rule that the agent must forfeit all
compensation paid or payable over the entire period of the agent’s disloyalty . . .”); Astra, 914 N.E.2d at
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generally will not permit an employee to offset against the disgorged
compensation the value of any benefits that might have flowed from the
employee’s work during the relevant period.221 In Astra, as noted above, the court
deemed it appropriate to disgorge all of the compensation that Bildman earned
during the five-year period of his disloyalty—1991 through 1996—despite
evidence that Bildman successfully had performed his job duties during this
period, generating profits for his employer.222 The Second Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in Phansalkar, finding that the employer could disgorge all
compensation earned by the disloyal employee during the period of the
disloyalty, and expressly declining to limit disgorgement only to compensation
for the specific tasks with respect to which the employee was disloyal.223
In Enstar, the Alabama federal court echoed this view, expressly rejecting
Grassgreen’s assertion that “it would not be equitable to require a total forfeiture
of compensation because, regardless of what he may have done wrong, he
worked diligently on behalf of the corporation and the corporation profited from
his work.”224 Noting a desire to enforce corporate officers’ and directors’ duty of
loyalty “as forcefully as possible,”225 the court disgorged “all salary, bonuses and
other compensation that were paid to [Grassgreen] by his corporation while he
was in breach of his duties”226—an amount totaling almost $5.5 million.227
Moreover, the Enstar court reached this conclusion while also acknowledging
the almost $2 million compensatory damages award already levied against
Grassgreen, and while remitting the jury’s $18 million punitive damages award
to a still-substantial $10 million.228 In other words, the court did not seem to view
the forfeiture of Grassgreen’s salary and benefits as compensation for the
employer, nor as “punishment” duplicative of the substantial punitive damages
in this case. Rather, the court seemed to see this disgorgement as grounded in
basic fairness and equity, citing with approval authority that characterized salary
forfeiture following a breach as “required because the agent’s services are not
being ‘properly’ performed.”229 In other words, Grassgreen never truly “earned”

48 (noting New York Appellate Division decisions that “generally have limited the period of forfeiture to
the period of the employee’s disloyalty”) (citations omitted).
221. See Warren, supra note 142, at 1142 (citations omitted); id. at 1136–37 (describing faithless
servant doctrine as requiring an agent who breaches fiduciary duties to “forfeit any compensation for
services rendered during the period of his breach even though part of those services may have been
properly performed”) (citation omitted).
222. 914 N.E.2d at 50-51; see also id. at 40.
223. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 206–08 (2nd Cir. 2003); see id. at 208
(stating that “forfeiture cannot appropriately be limited to only some transactions in these circumstances,
where the agreement calls for general compensation, and does not limit compensation to specific amounts
paid for the completion of specific tasks”).
224. Enstar Grp., Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F. Supp. 1562, 1573 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
225. Id. at 1574.
226. Id. at 1575.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1581–82.
229. Id. at 1574 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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his compensation during the period of disloyalty and thus lacked any entitlement
to such compensation.
For each of these courts, the justification for this total disgorgement seems
to stem from a belief that such significant wrongdoing in one aspect of an
employee’s performance taints all other aspects of his or her employment—even
those where the employee performed profitably for the employer.230 In this
respect, disgorgement—as a restitutionary remedy—differs significantly from
compensatory damages: While compensatory damages would focus primarily
upon the specific losses experienced by the employer,231 disgorgement “was not
developed to simply compensate the injured beneficiary for its losses, but to
provide recovery for all ill-gotten gains of the breaching fiduciary as well as his
salary and other compensation after the breach.”232
Of course, not every court applying forfeiture principles agrees with this
broad application of these doctrines. Instead, some courts take a more temperate
view regarding the amount of compensation to disgorge, limiting forfeiture only
to the compensation associated with those tasks that actually were performed in
a disloyal manner.233 In such jurisdictions, the court may apportion the forfeiture
of compensation and require disgorgement only as to salary or commissions with
respect to which it finds disloyalty.234 In Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., for example,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited a “possible relaxation of New York’s
strict rule demanding forfeiture of all of a faithless servant’s compensation . . .
in favor of a rule of apportionment under which only the fees related to the
‘specified items of work’ as to which the agent acted faithlessly would be
forfeited.”235 Sequa, however, predates by several years the Second Circuit’s
more recent decision in Phansalkar, which allowed the complete disgorgement
of a breaching fiduciary’s compensation (with the cases decided in 1998 and
2003, respectively).236 Thus, while some courts may appear to apply a more

230. See Warren, supra note 142, at 1142 (tracing rule imposing total disgorgement for period of
breach to idea that “the agent’s misconduct tainted or otherwise permeated his entire relationship with his
principal from the original point of breach going forward”).
231. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 14, § 3.1.
232. Warren, supra note 142, at 1137.
233. See Van Arsdale, supra note 13, §§ 2, 13 (citations omitted).
234. See id. § 13 (citations omitted).
235. 156 F.3d 136, 147 (2nd Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d
862, 874 (N.J. 2015) (noting that in applying factors to determine extent of disgorgement, a court need
not disgorge the entirety of a wrongdoer’s compensation, but rather may apportion disgorgement to the
extent appropriate); Schneider v. Wein & Malkin LLP, 2004 WL 2495843, at *18–19 (N.Y. App. Div.
Nov. 1, 2004) (citations omitted) (discussing various factors to apply in determining amount of
compensation to disgorge); cf. Richard F. Albert, Punishment Without Cause: Disgorgement and
Forfeiture
of
Salary
and
Pensions,
FORBES
(Apr.
2,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2014/04/02/punishment-without-cause-disgorgement-andforfeiture-of-salary-and-pensions/ [https://perma.cc/Y3Y8-6KTK] (discussing ruling in recent SEC
enforcement action confirming that “disgorgement under the federal securities laws reaches only so much
of a defendant’s gains as are shown to be causally related to the fraud”).
236. Compare Sequa, 156 F.3d, with Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184 (2nd
Cir. 2003).

2020

DISGORGING HARVEY WEINSTEIN’S SALARY

319

moderate version of the faithless servant doctrine to reach only compensation
directly tied to acts of disloyalty,237 other courts still seem to adhere to the harsher
version of this doctrine.238
Once again, while these jurisdictional differences may matter in many
cases, as applied to Weinstein, their significance fades. Even if Weinstein were
sued in a more restrictive jurisdiction that limited disgorgement only to the
compensation associated with tasks that actually were performed disloyally, as
discussed above, Weinstein’s disloyalty seemed to permeate every aspect of his
working life, from the way that he interacted with actresses to his use of
underlings to cover up his misconduct to his persuading of the board to use
company funds to pay off victims who dared to complain.239 One might argue
that there was no aspect of Weinstein’s working life that was cleansed of this
misconduct. Accordingly, even in a jurisdiction that requires a close connection
between any funds disgorged and any acts of misconduct, a plaintiff likely still
would be able to reach most (if not all) of Weinstein’s compensation.

C. Hitting Harvey Where it Hurts: Harvey Weinstein as a Faithless
Servant
Examining this compensation forfeiture jurisprudence in light of the
circumstances associated with the Weinstein controversy, one might wonder
about the potential applicability of disgorgement to Weinstein. On the most
obvious level, the factual parallels between the Weinstein matter and Astra are
striking: Just as Bildman “used Astra as his personal checkbook and sexual
fiefdom, in the process driving away employees, creating a corrosive corporate
atmosphere, causing Astra actual loss, and leading to months of bad publicity
about the company,”240 Weinstein likewise is alleged to have used the company
as his sexual playground and to have strong-armed other workers into
participating in his immoral and illegal behavior, all while enforcing a strict code
of silence among everyone involved.241 More broadly, Weinstein’s conduct
arguably reflects the sort of fiduciary breach with respect to which courts have
237. While these jurisdictions potentially employ a more lenient application of the faithless servant
doctrine and other forfeiture tools, courts in at least one such jurisdiction place the burden on the disloyal
employee to establish the “value” of any services provided to the employer. See Carroll & Weida, supra
note 197, at 9.
238. See, e.g., Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 208 (“Phansalkar is required to forfeit all compensation
awarded to him after . . . the date upon which his disloyalty began.”). Notably, the Restatement of
Employment Law echoes the more modest approach, allowing an employer to disgorge the compensation
paid to an employee who has breached his or her fiduciary duties only when “the employee’s
compensation cannot be apportioned between the employee’s disloyal services and the employee’s loyal
services; and . . . the nature of the employee’s disloyalty is such that there is no practicable method for
making a reasonable calculation of the harm caused the employer by the employee’s disloyal services.”
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 2019)
239. See supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text.
240. Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 51, n. 30 (Mass. 2009).
241. See generally Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1; Faughnder et al., supra
note 33; Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32.
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ordered compensation forfeiture: While not a breach involving a more
prototypical wrong like embezzlement or usurping corporate clients,
“[p]resumably it counts as bad faith if a co-chairman were to use his position of
power at the company to harass and sexually assault potential and actual
employees while at the same time endangering the firm’s reputation.”242 Thus,
Weinstein’s conduct might well be seen as forming the underlying basis for a
breach of fiduciary duty claim necessary to trigger a forfeiture remedy.243
Applying the faithless servant doctrine to sexual misconduct like
Weinstein’s also dovetails with much of the research regarding the best ways for
changing workplace culture.244 First, disgorging compensation from a company’s
fiduciaries unquestionably models a “serious, sober approach” to addressing
workplace harassment,245 since most individuals would view the loss of some or
all of their compensation as a grave indication of wrongdoing. Unlike empty
statements of regret or consternation that may be issued by a company or its
board, requiring the forfeiture of compensation paid to a disloyal worker
demonstrates how seriously a company takes such wrongdoing. Similarly, such
a loss of compensation undoubtedly constitutes a “concrete negative
ramification” for this individual’s misbehavior.246 Indeed, in Weinstein’s case,
an application of the faithless servant doctrine would lead to the disgorgement of
millions of dollars, particularly if the court took into account such benefits as
Weinstein’s lush travel budget and backend revenue deals on his films.247 This
seems particularly important where, as noted above, Weinstein may not
otherwise personally experience direct financial consequences for his
wrongdoing, given that the bulk of the civil claims against him seem likely to
settle and will likely be covered in full by the Weinstein Company’s insurance
providers.248 Finally, in its own way, applying disgorgement principles to these
situations could “alter[] the power structure” within the organization as a
whole,249 not necessarily by increasing the representation of women within the
organization, but perhaps by stripping power (financial power, at least) from
those whose conduct warrants such a relegation. If there is any truth to the mantra
that “money is power,” then using the faithless servant doctrine to disgorge funds
from powerful harassers like Weinstein could at a minimum shake up the
hierarchy within the organization.
Even when applying the specific criteria for disgorgement set forth in Kaye
v. Rosefielde, forfeiture of at least some of Weinstein’s compensation seems to

242.

Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. (noting that directors and officers breach their fiduciary duties when they “act in bad faith
for a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the company”) (quotation marks omitted).
244. See supra § II.B.
245. See supra § II.B.1.
246. See supra § II.B.2.
247. See supra notes 47, 50–51 and accompanying text; infra § III.D.
248. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
249. See supra § II.B.3.
243.
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be a possible remedy.250 First, the Kaye court listed “the employee’s degree of
responsibility and level of compensation.”251 As one of the founders and cochairmen of the Weinstein Company,252 Harvey Weinstein enjoyed virtually
limitless power within the organization, and his compensation of over
$3,000,000 per year almost certainly dwarfed that of most (if not all) other
individuals in the organization.253 Second, the Kaye court identified as a factor
“the number of acts of disloyalty.”254 Weinstein’s disloyalty infused virtually all
that he did, encompassing his interactions with a vast array of players across the
entertainment industry, from mega-stars to unknown interns.255 Indeed, with
dozens of women already having publicly come forward to accuse Weinstein of
assault, harassment, and rape (among other charges),256 and perhaps countless
others who have not yet come forward or been identified publicly,257 a court
readily could assume that Weinstein engaged in numerous acts of disloyalty.
The Kaye court further identified “the extent to which those acts placed the
employer’s business in jeopardy” as a criterion to consider when contemplating
forfeiture.258 Once again, this factor weighs heavily in favor of disgorging
Weinstein’s compensation. While one could argue that, in the short term,
Weinstein’s behavior might have created advantages for his companies in the

250. 121 A.3d 862, 874 (N.J. 2015). Admittedly, Kaye itself may be of minimal precedential value
in any existing litigation involving Weinstein. As previously noted, Weinstein reportedly reached a
tentative settlement on the bulk of the civil claims against him, see supra note 52, and it is unclear whether
any remaining civil claims will be litigated in a jurisdiction governed by Kaye. (For example, the actress
Ashley Judd, who declined to join the settlement, brought her suit in a California federal court. See Corky
Siemaszko, Ashley Judd Goes It Alone, Says She is Not Settling with Hollywood Honcho Harvey
Weinstein, NBC News (May 24, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ashley-judd-goes-italone-says-she-not-settling-hollywood-n1010141 [https://perma.cc/P4RH-W8FC]. Additional cases
against Weinstein—both pending and resolved—are criminal in nature, see supra note 36 and therefore
also not bound by the Kaye decision. Nonetheless, the rationale of Kaye may prove to be helpful guidance
for courts considering this novel approach.
251. Kaye, 121 A.3d at 874.
252. See Farrow, supra note 1.
253. See Dade Hayes & Dawn C. Chmielewski, Harvey Weinstein’s Salary, Perks and Code of
Conduct:
Read
His
Employment
Contract,
DEADLINE
(June
7,
2018),
https://deadline.com/2018/06/harvey-weinstein-salary-perks-code-of-conduct-employment-contract1202405670/ [https://perma.cc/D5QE-TK87]. Weinstein’s most recent contract with the Weinstein
Company—a three-year agreement that took effect in January 2016—paid him a base salary of $2,626,275
per year, with $500,000 per year guaranteed for private air travel. Id. Weinstein also was contractually
assured of flying first class in those instances when he did not fly private, and received an allowance for
“a first-class car and a driver, limousine transportation and first class private business travel expenses,
including hotel suites and per diems.” Id.
254. Kaye, 121 A.3d at 874.
255. See generally Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
256. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
257. See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 8–10 (noting widely divergent statistics when
measuring percentage of women who have experienced sexual harassment); LaMagna I, supra note 7
(noting “the person targeted for harassment is the one that faces retaliation and being blackballed in their
profession”) (quotation marks omitted).
258. 121 A.3d at 874.
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form of greater power and influence,259 the end result of his behavior
unquestionably hurt the company—bringing terrible publicity and ultimately
financial ruin.260 As discussed previously, within weeks of the scandal becoming
public, one of the company’s largest creditors purportedly demanded an
immediate repayment of a $45 million loan that it had made to the Weinstein
Company,261 and other longstanding corporate partners immediately distanced
themselves from the company.262
Finally, the Kaye court cited “the degree of planning to undermine the
employer that is undertaken by the employee” as a factor in determining whether
disgorgement is appropriate.263 Countless witnesses have made clear that
Weinstein’s indiscretions were not isolated instances of spontaneous poor
judgment, but rather involved great degrees of premeditation.264 Weinstein
repeatedly deputized countless others within the Weinstein Company to facilitate
his sexual misconduct.265 In addition, Weinstein himself appears to have engaged
in a concerted attempt to cover up his illegal behavior, working with his lawyers
and public relations team to “conduct[] a decades-long campaign to suppress
these stories.”266
Looking even more broadly at the philosophical underpinnings of
compensation disgorgement, Weinstein’s conduct falls squarely within the
remedial goals of this doctrine. Compensation disgorgement (whether in the
form of the faithless servant doctrine or operating under another label) is an
equitable, restitutionary remedy.267 As already noted, restitution differs from the
legal remedy of damages in that, while damages aim to lessen or eliminate the

259. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (citing Oscar host’s joke regarding actresses
“pretending” to be attracted to Weinstein); see also Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (describing movies
as Weinstein’s “private leverage” with female actresses and others); Vongkiatkajorn, supra note 30
(asserting that “[d]espite Weinstein’s predatory behavior, he continued to make money off [his victims’]
work”).
260. See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text.
261. See Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32.
262. See id.
263. Kaye, 121 A.3d at 874. Notably, the Kaye court did not elaborate regarding the specificity of
intent by the employee that is required to trigger disgorgement, i.e., whether the employee must actually
intend to harm the employer vs. simply intend to engage in the activity that happens to result in harm. See
id.
264. See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 1 (quoting one executive who worked for Weinstein for many
years, observing that “[t]his wasn’t a one-off. This wasn’t a period of time . . . This was ongoing predatory
behavior toward women – whether they consented or not”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Kantor
& Twohey, supra note 1.
265. See Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
266. Farrow, supra note 1 (detailing the role that Weinstein’s staff often played in facilitating and
then covering up these encounters); see also Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (discussing the “code of
silence” enforced by Weinstein, holding Weinstein Company employees to contracts promising that “they
will not criticize [the company] or its leaders in a way that could harm [the company’s] business reputation
or any employee’s personal reputation”) (internal quotations omitted).
267. John C. Kairis, Disgorgement of Compensation Paid to Directors During the Time They Were
Grossly Negligent: An Available But Seldom Used Remedy, 13 DEL. L. REV. 1, 6, 8–9 (2011).
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harm that a plaintiff has suffered,268 restitution focuses on disgorging a
defendant’s wrongful gain.269 Thus, a court considering whether to apply
disgorgement to Harvey Weinstein would not focus upon the extent to which the
plaintiff (presumably, Weinstein’s former employer, the Weinstein Company)
may have suffered due to Weinstein’s misconduct; rather, the court’s attention
would remain upon how Weinstein himself might wrongfully have gained from
his misbehavior.270
Weinstein likely profited in a variety of ways from his behavior.
Weinstein’s power within the entertainment industry (before his fall, of course)
was undisputed, with individuals who worked in all aspects of the business
feeling compelled to kowtow to him in meetings, on movie sets, and even from
the awards show stage.271 Yet while Weinstein’s power enabled his sexual
exploits,272 his sexual exploits also seemed to make him more powerful, giving
him greater control over the careers of the women who complied—or not—with
his overtures.273 In this way, the sexual power that Weinstein wrongfully asserted
over his victims ultimately may have translated into his power within Hollywood
more generally, in a sort of vicious cycle: While Weinstein’s control within the
industry functioned to silence his victims who feared retaliation if they spoke out
against him,274 the aura of omnipotence and untouchable-ness that such silence
created fostered the notion that Weinstein was to be worshipped, acceded to, and
protected from reproach—a mentality that could not help but enhance his
professional ability to dictate the who, when, and how of celebrity appearances
in his films. He burnished his own star by proving that he quite literally could do
whatever he wanted, to whomever he wanted, inevitably giving him greater
power within the industry overall.
Weinstein’s harsh mistreatment of those around him also may have
bolstered his power on a more basic level, with the success of Weinstein’s
movies perhaps being more inextricably tied to his misbehavior. As at least one
observer has noted, Weinstein and his brother Bob became known for their
“alchemical skill at attracting top talent, squeezing maximum profit out of genre
schlock, and reliably conjuring awards-season gold—seemingly on strength of
268. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. THOMAS ET AL., CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE TORTS § 5:1 (2019); see
also Dobbs, supra note 14, § 3.1.
269. See Kairis, supra note 267, at 6 (observing that disgorgement has functioned as “an equitable,
rather than legal, remedy, designed to prevent the wrongdoer from profiting from the wrongdoing, rather
than as a way to compensate the plaintiff for any losses”).
270. As discussed in greater detail below, the Weinstein Company’s own alleged complicity in
Harvey Weinstein’s wrongdoing complicates the analysis. See infra § III.D.
271. Farrow, supra note 1.
272. See supra note 241 and accompanying text; Farrow, supra note 1 (quoting one victim of
Weinstein saying “[t]he type of control he exerted – it was very real . . . Even just his presence was
intimidating”); Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (observing that “movies were . . . his private leverage”).
273. See generally Farrow, supra note 1 (detailing Weinstein’s offers to aid the careers of women
who complied with his sexual requests and his alleged retaliation against actresses who refused his
advances); Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (discussing same).
274. See generally Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
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the brothers’ brash personalities alone.”275 Perhaps Weinstein’s need to harass
and intimidate became such a part of his modus operandi that, had he suddenly
and magically morphed into a kind and gentle Beta-male, his very brand (and his
ability to execute upon that brand) would have suffered.276 Thus, while Weinstein
may not have “benefitted” from his sexual misconduct as directly or concretely
as the executive who absconds with his employer’s clients or the employee who
embezzles his employer’s funds, Weinstein did arguably gain—both personally
and professionally—from his harassing behavior.
As conventional tools for addressing sexual harassment at work have
proven fairly ineffective in combating this misbehavior, perhaps the more novel
faithless servant doctrine and other compensation forfeiture tools can serve as a
more successful way to alter the workplace culture. Moving beyond mere
compensatory damages to apply compensation disgorgement to a wrongdoer like
Weinstein might represent a more powerful approach, going beyond simply
making a plaintiff whole with respect to the wrongs involved in a particular
situation and instead deterring misbehavior in a broader manner by making that
misbehavior unprofitable for the wrongdoer.277 Even in those jurisdictions that
apply the faithless servant doctrine in its most limited form by requiring proof of
harm to the employer and/or some connection between the employee’s wrongful
275. See Chris Lee, Wait, How Is The Weinstein Company Worth Nearly $500 Million?, NEW YORK:
VULTURE (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.vulture.com/2018/01/how-is-the-weinstein-company-worthnearly-usd500-million.html [https://perma.cc/PLD2-CSJY]; Farrow, supra note 1 (observing that
Weinstein “combined a keen eye for promising scripts, directors, and actors with a bullying, even
threatening, style of doing business, inspiring both fear and gratitude”).
276. Many thanks to my colleague, Daniel Yeager, for suggesting this interesting perspective
regarding Weinstein’s misconduct. Notably, this idea that Weinstein’s misbehavior has served as some
essential component of the success of his films has left countless members of the entertainment industry
and the public conflicted about whether they should continue to enjoy his movies. As one entertainment
industry writer and editor observed, “I have a very hard time being able to separate the art from the artist.
I know that lying underneath whatever ‘genius’ is there, there’s something so much worse and it’s
something that hurts women. How can anyone derive joy or entertainment from that?” Stahler, supra note
51.
277. Notably, in addition to sending a more powerful message to workplace wrongdoers than simply
calculating compensatory damages, compensation disgorgement often will be much easier for plaintiffs
to prove. Proving the compensatory damages caused by an employee’s breach implicates a host of
remedial hurdles: Plaintiffs must establish that the fiduciary’s wrongdoing both directly and proximately
caused any damages that the employer may have suffered. See Dobbs, supra note 14, § 3.4; Carroll &
Weida, supra note 197 (explaining that usual remedy for breach of fiduciary duty would be consistent
with a tort remedy, requiring courts to look at the “amount of loss actually caused by the misconduct”).
Employers also must establish that any harm suffered by the company due to the fiduciary’s misconduct
was specifically foreseeable. See Dobbs, supra note 14, § 3.4. Employers further must prove their damages
to a reasonable degree of certainty, see id., something that can be difficult to do when grappling with
breaches of loyalty that can have inexact and/or reverberating harms such as bad publicity, loss of
goodwill, and loss of business opportunities. By applying the faithless servant doctrine or comparable
forfeiture doctrines, however, employers can avoid these calculation problems, as courts fairly easily can
establish the amount of compensation that a breaching fiduciary earned during a specified period of
breach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 801 cmt.d (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Forfeiture may
be the only available remedy when it is difficult to prove that harm to a principal resulted from the agent’s
breach or when the agent realizes no profit through the breach. In many cases, forfeiture enables a remedy
to be determined at a much lower cost to litigants.”).
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conduct and his or her job duties,278 much workplace sexual harassment likely
will satisfy this requirement—particularly when practiced at a scale such as that
shown by Harvey Weinstein. Where policies and training and temperate
guidance all fail to discourage sexual harassment in the workplace, the best
solution may be to hit bad actors where it hurts — in their pocketbooks.

D. But Who Gets Weinstein’s Salary? When the Faithless Servant
Works for a Culpable Master
In most (if not all) of the cases discussed above, requiring a breaching
fiduciary to forfeit his or her compensation would seem to achieve equitable
results due to the fiduciary’s failure properly to serve his or her innocent master.
Courts may take a different view, however, where the master/employer does not
inhabit such an innocent role, but rather shares some culpability with the
breaching employee. How can a court permit an employer to reap the financial
benefits of recouping some or all of an employee’s compensation when the
employer itself countenanced —and perhaps even joined in—the conduct
forming the basis of the fiduciary’s breach? A court contemplating whether to
apply forfeiture principles to Harvey Weinstein’s compensation might well
confront precisely this predicament.
In the weeks and months after the Weinstein story broke, various questions
arose regarding what involvement, if any, the Weinstein Company had in Harvey
Weinstein’s misconduct. The Weinstein Company Board of Directors initially
denied any knowledge regarding Weinstein’s misconduct, claiming to be
“shocked and dismayed” by these revelations279 and asserting that the charges
“came as ‘an utter surprise’ to [the Board].”280 However, many outsiders remain
skeptical about this alleged lack of awareness, pointing to settlement agreements
which were reported to the Board and which would have been part of the metric
considered in renewing Weinstein’s most recent contract in 2015.281 In fact,
Weinstein is purported to have settled harassment claims with at least eight
women during a roughly thirty-year period282—settlements that presumably
would be disclosed to the Board of Directors.283 This has led an attorney for one
accuser to argue that “executives must have long been on notice of [Weinstein’s]
behavior, based on the decades-long history of allegations and confidential
settlements now being made public.”284

278.

See supra notes 197–216 and accompanying text.
Faughnder et al., supra note 33 (quotation marks omitted).
280. Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32.
281. See id.; Faughnder et al., supra note 33.
282. See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
283. See Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (citing reports that the Board was informed of at least three
confidential settlements between Weinstein and his accusers); see also id. (referring to one board
member’s claim that “he knew about multiple settlements but had thought they were being used to conceal
consensual affairs”).
284. Faughnder et al., supra note 33.
279.
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The New York Times article that exposed Weinstein’s misconduct reinforces
this view, asserting that as early as 2015, several Weinstein Company board
members (including Harvey Weinstein’s brother and longtime business partner,
Bob) were alarmed about the allegations of harassment against Weinstein, but
ultimately “were assured there was no reason to investigate.”285 Moreover,
Weinstein’s most recent contract is purported to have explicitly addressed the
potential for future claims of misconduct against Weinstein, requiring Weinstein
to reimburse the Weinstein Company for any settlements or judgments arising
out of his misconduct and mandating additional payments to the Weinstein
Company for each instance of misconduct.286 Based on such evidence, at least
one scholar has suggested that the Weinstein Company’s Board of Directors itself
might be liable for breaching its fiduciary duty to investors for “exposing the
company to unreasonable financial risk, whether negligently or knowingly.”287
Thus, while various claims against the Weinstein Company and officers were
dismissed in April 2019,288 many still believe that the company at best ignored
the multitude of obvious danger signs, and at worst actively facilitated the
misbehavior and its subsequent cover-up.289
Further adding to the possibility that the company itself might share
responsibility for Weinstein’s actions is the tremendous gain that the Weinstein
Company accrued, at least indirectly, from Weinstein’s misbehavior. As
previously discussed, Weinstein’s bullying and harassing conduct not only
victimized female actresses and others in the entertainment industry; it also gave
Weinstein greater power within the business, thus aiding him in his quest to
dominate the industry, secure the work of any actress that he desired, and control
how such actresses operated both on and off the set.290 While such powerhoarding benefitted Weinstein personally in various ways (sexual and
otherwise),291 it undoubtedly garnered substantial benefits for the Weinstein
Company as well, in the form of more successful movies with bigger stars and
greater market dominance.292 While much public attention has been focused on
the dire financial consequences for the Weinstein Company in the wake of the

285.

Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
Faughnder et al., supra note 33.
287. Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32. At least one law firm has claimed to be actively “investigating
potential fiduciary violations by TWC directors,” soliciting information (and potential clients?) with
respect to any such breach by the company. See Hagens Bergman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Weinstein Company
Investor Alert: Hagens Bergman Investigating Potential Fiduciary Violations by TWC Directors, CISION
PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/weinstein-companyinvestor-alert-hagens-berman-investigating-potential-fiduciary-violations-by-twc-directors300537631.html [https://perma.cc/YFZ2-JVDU].
288. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
289. See Vongkiatkajorn, supra note 30; FORBES, supra note 41 (noting that “[i]f what these women
say is true, and The Weinstein Company and others went to great lengths to cover up Harvey’s misdeeds
and hush his accusers, this [RICO] case, unless settled, will most likely see its day in court”).
290. See supra notes 241, 272 and accompanying text.
291. See id.
292. See supra notes 272–76 and associated text.
286.
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scandal, for years the Weinstein Company flourished as at least an indirect result
of Harvey Weinstein’s misbehavior.
Concerns therefore may arise in applying traditional compensation
forfeiture principles to Harvey Weinstein, in that such disgorgement would allow
a possibly culpable master (the Weinstein Company) to reap significant financial
benefits from its servant’s misbehavior. Accordingly, a more sensible application
of forfeiture to this matter might allow shareholders—or, perhaps, even victims
of Weinstein’s misconduct—to receive any compensation that ultimately is
disgorged from Weinstein. Reaching such a legal result presents various
difficulties, however. For example, it is unclear how any such legal action might
be initiated. While a company’s board of directors may bring a breach of
fiduciary duty claim against a disloyal officer,293 to date, no board member has
brought such an action against Weinstein, and no board member has indicated a
likelihood of doing so. Indeed, with many of the claims against Weinstein and
the Weinstein Company now having either been dismissed or tentatively settled,
likely at the Weinstein Company’s insurance carriers’ expense,294 there seems to
be little incentive for any board member to sue.
In the absence of a traditional breach of fiduciary duty claim, shareholders
could pursue a “derivative action”—a lawsuit brought by shareholders on behalf
of the company.295 Essentially, shareholders would stand in the shoes of the
Weinstein Company Board to seek compensation from Weinstein on behalf of
the company. Such derivative lawsuits impose a high standard on plaintiffs,
however: A plaintiff first must demand that the corporation itself bring suit,
something that seems unlikely to happen.296 Moreover, if the corporation refuses
such a demand, the plaintiff must prove that the corporate directors could not
have exercised “independent and disinterested business judgment” in their
decision not to sue.297 In applying this “business judgment rule” to a
corporation’s decision not to sue, courts have made clear that “the board of
directors is presumed to be disinterested and to have acted on an informed basis,
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the corporation.”298 Accordingly, a board’s decisions—including the
decision not to sue—”will not be disturbed by a court if [it] can be attributed to

293. See Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (observing that breach of fiduciary duty claims against a
company’s officers generally must be initiated by the company itself, rather than by disgruntled
shareholders or other outsiders).
294. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
295. See RICHARD D. FREER & DOUGLASS K. MOLL, PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 476
(2013) (noting that shareholders may bring derivative actions when Board members themselves have
breached their duties of care and/or loyalty); Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32.
296. See Freer & Moll, supra note 295, at 484.
297. See Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32; Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the
Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW
503, 504–05 (1989).
298. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 297, at 504–05 (citations omitted).
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any rational business purpose.”299 Thus, so long as the Weinstein Company
Board could demonstrate that its decision not to pursue legal action against
Weinstein stemmed from any rational business reason, a shareholder derivative
action against the Weinstein Company would seem unlikely to succeed.
In some instances, however, courts have excused plaintiffs from complying
with this demand requirement if the plaintiff can show that such a demand would
be “futile”—for example, by showing that directors would not be willing to act
on a demand because of a conflict of interest or because the board itself bears
some liability for the wrong in question.300 Such circumstances sometimes give
rise to Caremark claims (named after a 1996 case involving allegations of fraud
at a company bearing the same name).301 In Caremark claims, investors assert
that the directors of a company breached their fiduciary duties by causing or
permitting the company to break the law, or by failing to oversee a monitoring
system that would ensure the company’s compliance with the law.302 In other
words, Caremark claims place liability on the board itself for failing to act in the
face of “red flags” that “would make a reasonable person— who has the duty to
advance the best interests of the company—take action and avoid further harm
to the company. . . .”303 In the context of the Weinstein Company, shareholders
would allege that board members of the Weinstein Company breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to properly monitor Weinstein, and that board
members’ own potential liability now prevents them from exercising
“independent and disinterested judgment” in deciding whether to sue Weinstein
themselves.304
Given the anecdotal evidence regarding the Weinstein Company Board’s
awareness of and failure to respond to Weinstein’s ongoing misdeeds,305 a
Caremark claim at first blush seems to represent a plausible approach. Caremark
claims, however, also present significant hurdles for potential plaintiffs; only a
showing of “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and
reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability.”306 Delaware courts interpreting Caremark have held that
299.

Id. at 505 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMs, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 518–19 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 4th ed. 2019).
301. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); see R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A.
FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16 (3d ed. 1998);
Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32; Ted Johnson, Weinstein Scandal Triggers Questions of Corporate
Liability and Even Complicity, VARIETY (Oct. 25, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/harveyweinstein-sexual-harassment-corporate-liability-21st-century-fox-1202598683/ [https://perma.cc/NP9CPBW4].
302. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970; see also BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 301, § 4.16; Hemel
& Lund I, supra note 32; Johnson, supra note 301.
303. Johnson, supra note 301.
304. Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (citations omitted).
305. See supra notes 281–87 and accompanying text.
306. Id. at 971.
300.
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this high standard may be met when “red flags . . . are either waved in one’s face
or displayed so that they are visible to the careful observer.”307 Perhaps Harvey
Weinstein’s three decades of workplace sexual misconduct—misconduct so
blatant that it became the entertainment industry’s worst kept secret308—might
meet this high standard, thus allowing this claim to serve as a vehicle for
investors to get relief.
Corporate law experts can debate the best vehicle for finding liability
against Weinstein and/or the Weinstein Company Board, based upon their
collective misconduct. The more intriguing question, however, remains whether
the proper remedy for any such claim might involve applying the faithless servant
doctrine or a similar compensation forfeiture tool to disgorge Weinstein’s
compensation during the period in which he breached his fiduciary duties —and
presumably to do so in a way that ensures that the Weinstein Company itself does
not reap the financial benefits of such disgorgement. Should disgorgement
principles be applied to Weinstein’s compensation, any funds collected should
be directed to the shareholders whose economic interest in the company has been
decimated, or perhaps to Weinstein’s victims whose lives were negatively
impacted by his misconduct.309 Applying compensation disgorgement to
predators like Harvey Weinstein provides companies with a powerful tool not
only to demonstrate that egregious sexual misconduct negates any value that the
misbehaving employee otherwise brought to the company, but also to
communicate to their employees and to the public at large that their workplace
culture will not tolerate such misbehavior.
CONCLUSION
More than three decades after the U.S. Supreme Court first deemed
workplace sexual harassment unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,310 employers, employees, academics and members of the public continue
to puzzle over how to stem this tide of inappropriate sexual misconduct at work.

307.

Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
See supra notes 281–90 and accompanying text.
309. One possible idea might involve creating a trust to hold the disgorged funds for the benefit of
Weinstein’s victims. See Investor Bulletin: How Victims of Securities Law Violations May Recover
Money, U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alertsbulletins/ib_recovermoney.html [https://perma.cc/966N-HEL6]. While such an idea is intriguing, it
presents multiple difficulties, the resolution of which fall outside the scope of this paper. For example,
should all victims of Weinstein’s inappropriate conduct benefit from this fund, from those who “merely”
endured tasteless comments from Weinstein to those who suffered from physical assaults and/or rapes?
Must an individual serve as a named plaintiff and/or as part of a class action against Weinstein in order to
collect from such a fund? What level of proof must one show in order to collect? Do all victims collect
equal shares from such a fund, or should an administrator parcel out funds according to the degree of
harm? Cf. Jill S. Chanen & Margaret G. Tebo, Accounting for Lives: The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund
Worked. But What About Next Time?, ABA J. (Sept. 2007) (discussing complicated method employed by
Special Master Kenneth Feinberg in individualizing awards from 9/11 Victim Compensation fund).
310. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
308.
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The faithless servant doctrine and comparable compensation forfeiture tools
represent one possible solution to this problem.
Research shows that reducing sexual harassment in a workplace requires
more than just training, education, and pleas for good behavior. Instead,
employers must find a way to alter the broader culture in the workplace.
Employees must come to see sexual harassment as a substantial wrong—one that
is simply not tolerated by their employer. Disgorging a wrongdoer’s salary
conveys this type of significant statement, not only to the employee whose
compensation is disgorged, but also to the broader employee population. Perhaps
this is why the Employment Law Alliance—one of the world’s largest networks
of labor and employment lawyers311— described the faithless servant doctrine as
a “‘hulk’-like superhero,”312 one that “serves up justice with ‘smashing’ deterrent
impact.”313 The court in Astra likewise emphasized the importance of the
deterrent impact of this doctrine, observing that while “New York’s forfeiture
law has been described as harsh . . . , the harshness of the remedy is precisely the
point.”314 Engaging in the compensation forfeiture contemplated by the faithless
servant doctrine and similar mechanisms conveys a clear message to workers
regarding what type of behavior simply will not be tolerated in the workplace.
There likely is no perfect tool for entirely eliminating sexual harassment at
work. Dynamics of power and gender will continue to shape how employees
interact with one another, leading some to behave in a manner that includes
egregious and potentially unlawful sexual conduct or advances. While neither
the faithless servant doctrine nor other compensation forfeiture tools represent
the magic bullet, they do represent a new possible approach—one that might
make headway in this longstanding and vexing problem, if applied in a way that
properly addresses potential employer misconduct as well.

311. See About Us, EMP’S LAW ALL., https://www.ela.law/about_us [https://perma.cc/M88ALUDP] (last visited May 4, 2020).
312. Howard M. Miller, Employment Law’s “Hulk”-Like Superhero—The Faithless Servant
Doctrine—Just
Got
Stronger,
EMP’T
LAW
ALL.
(June
8,
2016),
https://www.ela.law/firms/bsk/articles/employment-law-s-hulk-like-superhero-the-faithless-servantdoctrine-just-got-stronger [https://perma.cc/M88A-LUDP].
313. Id.
314. Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 51–52 (citations and quotation marks omitted);
see also Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d 862, 873 (N.J. 2015) (reasoning that “disgorgement may also have
a valuable deterrent effect because its availability signals agents that some adverse consequences will
follow a breach of fiduciary duty” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d (2005)
(quotation marks omitted)); cf. Warren, supra note 142, at 1137 (discussing “equitable clawback” of
compensation and observing that it serves a “prophylactic function, deterring financial misbehavior
through the imposition of a risk of forfeiture that could far exceed the proceeds . . . derived from the
fiduciary’s misconduct”).

